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Samuel R. Wiseman

Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored
abstract. Although detention for dangerousness has received far more attention in recent
years, a significant number of non-dangerous but impecunious defendants are jailed to ensure
their presence at trial due to continued, widespread reliance on a money bail system.
This Essay develops two related claims. First, in the near term, electronic monitoring will
present a superior alternative to money bail for addressing flight risk. In contrast to previous
proposals for reducing pretrial detention rates, electronic monitoring has the potential to reduce
both fugitive rates (by allowing the defendant to be easily located) and government expenditures
(by reducing the number of defendants detained at state expense).
Second, despite the potential benefits to defendants and governments, electronic
monitoring is not likely to be adopted by legislative or executive action. The best prospect for
meaningful change is the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive bail. To achieve this
goal, however, the courts will, for the first time, have to develop a meaningful jurisprudence of
excessiveness to test the fit between the government’s pretrial goals and the means employed to
accomplish them. This Essay begins this inquiry, arguing that the text, purpose, and history of
the Amendment all support the requirement that the chosen means be, at minimum, not
substantially more burdensome than necessary. Under this standard, a money bail system that
leads to widespread detention without a corresponding increase in performance or savings
cannot survive in the face of a less restrictive technological alternative.
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introduction
Innocent or not, roughly half a million people in the United States are in
jail awaiting the resolution of the charges against them at any given time.1
Some of these defendants are dangerous, but a significant number are charged
with nonviolent offenses and simply cannot afford relatively modest bonds
imposed to assure their presence at future court appearances; roughly thirty
percent of state court defendants assigned bonds of less than $5,000 are
detained.2 They cannot work during the often considerable time that they
spend in jail3—leaving any children and other dependents to fend for

1.

2.

3.

Shima Baradaran, The State of Pretrial Detention, in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2011, at
187, 190 (Myrna S. Raeder ed., 2011) (estimating that there are 500,000 total pretrial
detainees in the United States); The Socioeconomic Impact of Pretrial Detention, OPEN SOC’Y
JUST. INITIATIVE 16 (2011), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files
/socioeconomic-impact-pretrial-detention-02012011.pdf (listing the pretrial population at
476,000).
Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (Nov. 2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.
Five out of six defendants jailed pretrial are jailed because they cannot afford bail amounts.
See id. In some cases this reflects a judgment (in the form of a high bail setting) that the
defendants are dangerous, but in other cases not. It is difficult to separate out these numbers
because some states allow judges to impose higher bail amounts to control for
dangerousness; it is likely safe to assume, however, that the low bail amounts at the
state level are typically imposed on non-dangerous defendants, and the statistics for
this low-bond defendant class are compelling. See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Address at the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110601.html (noting that
many pretrial detainees have been “charged with crimes ranging from petty theft to public
drug use,” and that they are detained “because they simply cannot afford to post the
bail required—very often, just a few hundred dollars—to return home until their
day in court arrives”); Criminal Justice Section, State Policy Implementation Project,
A.B.A. 2, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice
/spip_handouts.pdf [hereinafter A.B.A. Study] (“Two thirds of the 500,000 individuals
incarcerated in jail and awaiting trial are low bail risk . . . pos[ing] no significant risk to
themselves or the community, as well as representing a low risk of flight.” (emphasis
added)). A defendant’s income affects both whether he ends up in jail and the length of his
pretrial detention. See Mary T. Phillips, Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 1:
Nonfelony Cases, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, INC. 9, 22 (2007), http://www.cjareports
.org/reports/detention.pdf (noting in an empirical study of New York City nonfelony
defendants in 2003-2004 that “[e]very $1,000 increase in bail amount was accompanied by
an average increase in 2.3 days in pretrial detention time” and that “a lack of income . . . led
to a longer [pretrial] detention”).
Between October 1, 2003, and September 30, 2004, federal defendants detained pretrial
because they could not afford bail, whose cases were eventually terminated, spent an average
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themselves—and their jobs may not be waiting for them when they get out.4
Apart from the often devastating impact of pretrial detention on defendants
and their families, the Attorney General has estimated that the annual cost to
taxpayers is nine billion dollars.5 Nor is the bail system outstandingly effective:
roughly fifteen percent of defendants released on commercial bonds fail to
make at least one court appearance.6 Responding to these problems, both the
Conference of Chief Judges and the Conference of State Court Administrators
have recently called for the use of more accurate pretrial assessments of
dangerousness and flight risk, and for the release of non-dangerous
defendants.7
Although rising detention rates and shrinking governmental budgets have
recently brought these issues wider attention, their basic contours have not
changed for decades.8 With the rapid advance of computing technology,
however, the available solutions have changed a great deal. Increasingly
sophisticated remote monitoring devices have the potential to sharply reduce
the need for flight-based pretrial detention. In a world in which scientists can
monitor and recapture wolves,9 snakes,10 and even manatees11 in the wild, and

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

10.

of 71.2 days in jail. Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 55
tbl.3.11 (Dec. 2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf; see also United
States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 547-48 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding a sixteen-month pretrial
detention period constitutional, but noting “that in many, perhaps most, cases, sixteen
months would be found to exceed” constitutional limits).
See infra notes 50-52.
Holder, supra note 2.
For defendants in the 75 largest counties between 1990 and 2004, 86,107 were released on
surety bond. Of these defendants, 13,411 failed to appear within a one-year study period.
Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 2, 8.
Arthur W. Pepin, 2012-2013 Policy Paper: Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, CONF. ST.
CT. ADMINS. 11 (2012), http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy
%20Papers/Evidence%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-Final.ashx; Todd Ruger, Chief
Judges Group Calls for Changes in How Courts Determine Bail, BLT: BLOG LEGALTIMES (Feb.
6, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/02/chief-judges-group-calls-for
-changes-in-how-courts-determine-bail.html.
See, e.g., ARTHUR LAWTON BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 164 (1927) (noting the
burden on poor defendants).
See Nancy jo Tubbs, What Is Radio Telemetry?, INT’L WOLF CENTER,
http://www.wolf.org/wolves/experience/telemsearch/telem_defined.asp (last visited Sept.
13, 2013).
See Julius Whigham II, Burmese Python Carrying 87 Eggs Sets State Record at 17 Feet, 7
Inches, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 13, 2012, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/local
/burmese-python-sets-state-record-at-17-feet-7-inch/nQ9w5.
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AT&T Wireless offers family-member tracking for $10/month,12 the question
of finding other ways of ensuring a non-dangerous defendant’s presence at
trial is one not of ability, but of will—albeit a difficult one. By reducing jail
populations, these technologies can lower overall costs—it costs at least four
times as much to jail a defendant as it does to monitor him13—and, while
invasive, are vastly preferable to a jail cell for most defendants.
Among bail reform advocates, however, monitoring has relatively few vocal
proponents, perhaps due to understandable, but (I will argue) probably
overstated, privacy concerns. Indeed, the problems addressed in this Essay are
in some respects the reverse of the usual concerns about criminal justice
technology. The rapid advance of technology has been accompanied by a
corresponding increase in legal scholarship concerned about its effect on the
relationship between government and society. And not without reason, of
course: increasingly efficient, inexpensive, and nearly invisible methods of
surveillance and control have the potential to radically alter that relationship,
and law and lawyers are appropriately concerned with preventing an Orwellian
disaster.14 Largely omitted, however, from these larger debates is discussion of
where new government technology would be most beneficial.15 Although
placing GPS monitors on the free population would impose enormous privacy
costs, for those whom the government is already allowed to imprison in

11.

12.
13.

14.

15.

See, e.g., Nancy Sadusky, Stormy: A Success Story, SAVE THE MANATEE CLUB,
http://www.savethemanatee.org/newsfstormy.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (discussing a
satellite tracking device used on a manatee).
AT&T FamilyMap, AT&T, https://familymap.wireless.att.com/finder-att-family/welcome
.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 2009, at 3, 6 (indicating an average cost of $19,000 per pretrial detainee
and “between $3,100 and $4,600” per released defendant).
See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE 33-61 (2004) (critically describing modern police surveillance); CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 3 (2007) (noting that surveillance has changed due to the “ease with which it
can be conducted” and “the strength of the government’s resolve to use it”).
But cf. Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth
Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552-53 (2013) (noting that “advances in
technology can increase the effectiveness of surveillance in catching criminals without
reducing the privacy rights of ordinary citizens”); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1281-87 (1999) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment tends to raise the costs of policing drug markets in middle-class areas
relative to poor, urban neighborhoods).
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pursuit of its goals, technology that allows those goals to be achieved less
obtrusively is a nearly unalloyed good.
More critically, as previous generations of bail reformers found, motivating
governments to act for the benefit of the poor and unpopular against the will of
the commercial bail industry is an arduous task; at the legislative level it is
often nearly impossible.16 However, for the many detainees who are jailed not
for dangerousness but for flight risk, there are meaningful constitutional and
statutory grounds for future judicial intervention. A right to pretrial
monitoring fits squarely within existing state and federal statutes requiring
courts to impose the least restrictive conditions of release.17 More
fundamentally, although the Bail Clause has recently been somewhat neglected
by both courts and scholars, this is precisely the type of problem it was meant
to address: monetary conditions resulting in detention are excessive when
equally effective, and cost effective, alternatives for reducing flight risk are
available. That is the argument I advance here: (1) that poor, non-dangerous
criminal defendants are a discrete constituency in need of judicial protection
because they are effectively locked out of the political process (an argument
vividly illustrated by their current treatment under the Bail Reform Act), and
because historic efforts at reform have repeatedly failed; (2) that, while further
studies are needed, electronic pretrial monitoring is, or will soon be, a less
expensive, less burdensome, and judicially administrable alternative to money
bail for ensuring appearance at trial; and (3) that the emergence of this
alternative necessitates a new jurisprudence of excessiveness under the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of “[e]xcessive bail.”
The Supreme Court, although it has defined the narrow substantive
bounds of the Excessive Bail Clause, has failed to clarify how close the fit must
be between the reasons for restricting pretrial liberty and the burdens imposed.
Nor has the Court explained whether the analysis must consider reasonable
alternatives not provided by the legislature—thus leaving in question the
definition of “excessiveness” itself. As the number of pretrial detainees
continues to rise and monitoring technology improves, these questions are
likely to become vital, and as an initial step towards resolving them I suggest
that a standard resembling, at a minimum, intermediate scrutiny is warranted.

16.

17.

See, e.g., Betsy Kushlan Wanger, Note, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional
Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 330-35 (1987)
(explaining that many federal districts had not yet implemented reforms that would have
expanded pretrial services).
See infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
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Under this approach, maintaining a money bail system that consistently results
in detention for poverty is substantially more burdensome than necessary if an
equally effective and efficient option that does not rely on detention exists.
Part I of the Essay documents the serious problems with the current system
and the limitations of the most commonly proposed alternatives. Part II
provides an overview of existing monitoring technologies and their
implementation and presents the argument that the benefits of replacing
detention for flight risk with the use of pretrial monitoring far outweigh the
costs. It concludes that the usual objections to government monitoring—the
intrusion on individual privacy and the threat of surveillance extending to new
segments of society18—have relatively little force in the pretrial context, where
detention currently all but extinguishes privacy interests and the number of
criminal defendants is largely independent of the means of preventing flight.
Part III lays out the doctrinal avenues for achieving a right to pretrial
monitoring, defining the clearest and most likely path toward the right. In
addition to a strong case under current—but amendable—state and federal
statutes, there are powerful doctrinal, textual, and historic reasons to conclude
that the constitutional prohibition against excessive bail includes a right, for
many non-dangerous defendants, to have the option of electronic monitoring
in lieu of imprisonment.
The argument is more modest than it might initially seem—it would be an
incremental step in line with existing Eighth Amendment doctrine and would
require only that, once proven cost-effective relative to the current system,
certain forms of monitoring be available to defendants who would otherwise be
detained for risk of flight, not for dangerousness.19 Recognizing that there is an
important debate about the government institutions best suited to respond to
technological change, however, Part IV explains why courts are a proper venue
for reform. The long, mostly sad history of bail reform efforts suggests that
between a perhaps-justified legislative fear of being seen as soft on crime and
the existence of an entrenched public- and private-sector lobby opposed to
change, prospects for legislative adoption of a monitoring alternative are likely
to be dim in many jurisdictions.

18.
19.

See infra text accompanying notes 150-169.
Although electronic monitoring may reduce the risk of future crime, it will never be as
effective as detention. See, e.g., Anthea Hucklesby, Vehicles of Desistance? The Impact of
Electronically Monitored Curfew Orders, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 51, 60 (2008) (noting
that over half of seventy-eight offenders who were released, curfewed, and monitored “said
that curfew orders had not affected their offending, claiming to have offended as frequently
as before they were imposed”).
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i. flight risk, pretrial detention, and the need for
alternatives to money bail
Historically, the U.S. system of bail and associated pretrial detention was
employed solely to prevent pretrial flight,20 but increasingly, the many
individuals awaiting trial in jail are detained because a judge has deemed them
potentially dangerous.21 Although this type of detention raises serious
constitutional concerns, the liberty22 and privacy burdens placed on this subset
of detainees seem, to some extent, intuitively reasonable; if evidence suggests
that individuals could jeopardize the safety of their community while they
awaited trial, their detention might be merited.23 In light of the recent rise in
officially sanctioned detention for dangerousness, however, the modern
literature addressing the problems with bail tends to focus on this group of

20.

21.

22.
23.

See BEELEY, supra note 8, at 160 (“The purpose of bail law . . . is to insure the presence of
accused persons for trial . . . .”); Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 754 (2011) (noting that the “original purpose of bail” was “to assure that a
defendant appears at trial”); William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42
ALB. L. REV. 33, 68-69 (1977) (“The function of bail is . . . limited to insuring the presence of
a defendant before the court.”); David J. McCarthy, Jr. & Jeanne J. Wahl, The District of
Columbia Bail Project: An Illustration of Experimentation and a Brief for Change, 53 GEO. L.J.
675, 715 (1965) (“[T]he purpose of bail is to ensure that the accused will appear in court . . .
not to prevent the commission of crime.”). But see John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention:
A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 n.15 (noting
“historical rationales” that supported the use of bail to prevent crime pretrial).
JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 24 (1979) (noting the “state interest in protecting the community”);
Baradaran, supra note 20, at 745 n.131, 752 (documenting state court decisions allowing
consideration of dangerousness and noting that “[o]ver time, states increasingly changed
their positions” to consider community safety and other factors); Goldkamp, supra note 20,
at 30 (describing laws requiring judges to consider the threat defendants pose to the
community); Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 121 (2009) (documenting and criticizing the federal shift toward dangerousness
determinations).
Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1352 (2008) (“No one doubts that the
government infringes liberty when it physically incarcerates individuals.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (confirming the constitutionality of
congressional requirements for assessing dangerousness pretrial); Ronald J. Allen & Larry
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 781, 801-02 (2011) (largely defending detention for dangerousness and
arguing that “[f]ailure to intervene to prevent a likely harm” is “much more costly” than a
failure to convict a defendant for past crimes).
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pretrial detainees, highlighting the problems with predicting dangerousness,
the expansive judicial discretion allowed within this predictive process, and
suggesting better constitutional protections.24 Nonetheless, the Department of
Justice estimates that non-dangerous defendants make up approximately twothirds of the 500,000 defendants held pretrial in jails at any given time.25
These individuals are the product of a long tradition of money bail in the
United States.26 Since the founding of this country, judges have required
individuals to post some form of collateral27 in order to incentivize them to
appear at a trial that they strongly wish to avoid—a process that could
ultimately lead to their conviction and imprisonment. This system of money
bail is an archaic institution, a holdover from times when there were few police
officers and jails and when fleeing across a county or state line was more likely
to be an effective means of avoiding trial;28 requiring an individual or family
members to post something of value was a necessary and reasonable means of
preventing flight.
Recent, extensive changes in technology, such as the rise of Internet photos
and enhanced police communication, have greatly decreased flight incentives,

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.
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See, e.g., GOLDKAMP, supra note 21, at 18-31 (expressing concern about the vagueness of
dangerousness determinations and proposing a stricter standard); Baradaran, supra note 20,
at 767-70 (same).
See A.B.A. Study, supra note 2; see also John Schmitt et al., The High Budgetary Cost of
Incarceration, CENTER ECON. & POL’Y RES. 1 (2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents
/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf (finding that “[n]on-violent offenders now make
up over 60 percent of the prison and jail population”). This latter statistic is relevant only if
one assumes that the population of those accused but not yet convicted is similar to the
incarcerated population.
See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 37 (1967) (describing money bail as
“traditional practice”); John N. Mitchell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the
92nd Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 10 (Aug. 13, 1969),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/mitchell/1969/08-13-1969a.pdf (during a period of
money bail reform, noting that “[t]he money bail system . . . made an accused’s pretrial
freedom depend upon his bank account”).
Duker, supra note 20, at 70-71 (citing Consol. Exploration & Fin. Co. v. Musgrave, [1900] 1
Ch. 37 (U.K.)). Musgrave notes that the English system of using monetary sureties was
intended to ‘“prevent the accused from disappearing.’” Duker writes that “[t]his doctrine
was readily absorbed into American jurisprudence.” Id.
See id. at 41 (quoting F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 584 (2d ed.
1968)) (noting that in the early English system, which used pretrial release accompanied by
compensation, these requirements existed because imprisonment was “costly and
troublesome”).
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and technologies such as GPS monitoring also allow the police to easily
monitor those individuals who still have an incentive to flee.29 Yet money bail
still dominates the pretrial process in most states.30 This system typically
employs both personal bonds, in which an individual, friends, or family
members post the money or a percentage of the money with a court, and
commercial bonds, in which a bondsman becomes responsible for the amount
of the bond and charges the defendant a percentage of the bond amount as a
fee;31 both types are exceedingly problematic. Money bail is increasingly not an
alternative to pretrial detention but rather an enabler of the practice: as bail
amounts are set higher, and as financial inequalities become wider in the
United States, many individuals cannot pay and are thus detained while
awaiting trial.32 Increased pretrial detention harms poor defendants and their
families, leads to greater recidivism, and uses up scarce criminal justice
resources. These pervasive problems, explored in further detail below, create a
pressing need for an alternative to money bail and associated pretrial detention
of non-dangerous defendants. Advancing monitoring technology will soon, if
it does not already, provide this alternative.
A. The Burdens of Pretrial Detention
Non-dangerous individuals jailed to prevent flight suffer the same harms as
those detained for safety reasons—the same harms suffered by convicted
defendants.33 They are taken from their communities and physically barred
from the outside world, restricted to limited visits by family members and
attorneys.34 Their conversations are constantly monitored by guards and other
inmates, their mail is searched, and they are subjected to frequent and invasive

29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.

See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
Only four states have banned commercial bail. See Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 4.
See, e.g., Dayla S. Pepi & Donna D. Bloom, Take the Money or Run: The Risky Business of
Acting as Both Your Client’s Lawyer and Bail Bondsman, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 933, 938-39 (2006)
(describing the options available to Texas defendants).
See, e.g., Holder, supra note 2 (noting that a “disproportionate number of [pretrial
detainees] are poor” and are detained because they are indigent).
See infra notes 38-40.
See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 428
(2011) (describing the need for guaranteed representation “at the initial assessment of bail”
for indigent defendants).
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searches and pat-downs to ensure institutional security.35 To compound the
gravity of the harm, these high liberty and privacy burdens are often
prolonged; despite speedy trial requirements, many defendants awaiting trial
are detained for months.36
Being jailed also has a variety of more quantifiable negative effects. It
increases the likelihood that detainees will commit future crimes, substantially
impacts the quality of their defense, and encourages plea bargains—all of
which increase the likelihood that the detainee will be convicted, imprisoned,
and subjected to prolonged deprivation of liberty, privacy, and other
fundamental elements of human existence.
1. The Criminogenic and Plea-Inducing Effects of Pretrial Detention
Many inmates detained pretrial have been accused of low-level or nonviolent crimes,37 yet they are jailed with convicted criminals and potentially
dangerous defendants who await trial.38 Predictably, incarceration multiplies
the chances that the accused will learn criminal behavior.39 Those accused of
drug possession may develop new addictions, and non-violent criminals may
quickly learn violence (if only to defend themselves at first40). As months pass
and new defendants arrive, desperation may set in, leaving a potentially
permanent mark and possibly lingering violent tendencies.41

35.

36.

37.
38.

39.

40.

41.
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Indeed, the highly intrusive strip searches challenged in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders were a “standard part” of the intake practice at a pretrial detention facility. 132 S.
Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012).
See supra note 3; see also Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating
Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1962 (2005) (noting that “detention can be
extended indefinitely if any one of eighteen open-ended exclusions is satisfied”).
See Holder, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1320-21, 1363 (2012) (noting that “many . . .
nonviolent offenders do become dangerous after being exposed to violent criminals in jail or
prison”).
See, e.g., Arthur R. Angel et al., Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 300, 352 (1971) (noting that being jailed with criminals “leave[s] many
defendants hardened, embittered, and more likely to recidivate once released”).
See Richard C. McCorkle, Personal Precautions to Violence in Prison, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
160, 165 (1992) (noting that approximately seventy percent of prisoners surveyed in one
maximum security facility “got tough” with another inmate in self-defense).
See, e.g., Roger Bowles & Mark Cohen, Pre-Trial Detention: A Cost-Benefit Approach, DEP’T
FOR INT’L DEV. 34 (2009), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files
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Moreover, the current pretrial system produces false convictions in
addition to training real criminals. In the mid-1960s, the Manhattan Bail
Project led by the Vera Foundation concluded that “a person’s inability or
unwillingness to post bail may result in more than a temporary deprivation of
his liberty,”42 finding that those detained pretrial were more likely to be
convicted and imprisoned than those released on bail, regardless of whether
they had been previously charged or imprisoned.43 This trend has continued,
leading some to conclude that “[t]he most glaring concern of the pretrial
detainee is the large percentage of detainees who are eventually found guilty.”44
While this could simply suggest that judges assessing flight risk and
dangerousness are also accurately predicting guilt, further research suggests
several other likely contributors to this trend, which are troubling from an
equality perspective—and, of course, with respect to defendants’ long-term
liberty interests. One factor is the substantial difficulty faced by a pretrial
detainee attempting to mount a successful defense from a jail cell.45 The
defendant must recruit friends or family members to collect evidence and
witnesses and will often have difficulty communicating with his attorney due

42.

43.
44.

45.

/justice_20081124d_0.pdf (noting that pretrial detention “could create a long-term cost of
crime itself”).
Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641, 641 (1964); see also
Charles E. Ares, Anne Rankin & Herbert Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1963) (describing the Manhattan
Bail Project).
Rankin, supra note 42, at 648.
Douglas J. Klein, Note, The Pretrial Detention “Crisis”: The Causes and the Cure, 52 J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 281, 293 (1997); see also Manns, supra note 36, at 1972-73 (pointing to
“[n]umerous empirical studies”—most from the 1970s or 1980s—showing the longer the
period of pretrial detention, the higher the likelihood of conviction, “even after controlling
for factors such as the seriousness of the charges” and “prior convictions”); Phillips, supra
note 2, at 2-7, 56 (reviewing the literature finding a link between pretrial detention and case
outcomes, and, in an empirical analysis of defendants in New York City detained and
released in 2003-2004, finding that “detention to disposition” was “one of the most
important single factors” that influenced the “likelihood of conviction”); Thomas E. Scott,
Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1989) (“Both in 1987 and in 1988 approximately 85 percent of all detainees were
ultimately convicted of a criminal charge.”).
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2493 (2004) (noting that “[d]etained defendants find it harder to meet and strategize
with their lawyers and to track down witnesses”); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim,
Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 424 (1990) (“The differences in the
ability of the defendant [released pretrial] to work, maintain a family life, and prepare for
the defense of criminal charges are substantial.”).
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to limited visiting hours.46 The difficulty of preparing an adequate defense
makes the likelihood of success at trial much lower for pretrial detainees than
for those who have secured release and have avoided the stigma of a prison
cell.47
Faced with these high defense burdens, defendants jailed pretrial often
accept plea bargains in lieu of persevering through trial. In some cases, the
periods that defendants spend in jail awaiting trial is comparable to, or even
greater than, their potential sentences,48 thus substantially incentivizing quick
plea deals regardless of guilt or innocence. One empirical study found that of
the federal pretrial detainees in 1987 and 1988, about eighty-five percent were
criminally convicted, and that the majority of these convictions appeared to
have “resulted from some form of plea bargaining.”49
2. Financial Harm to Defendants and Their Families
Even if detention does not lead to a conviction, it places significant financial
costs on detainees and their families, who, in addition to suffering the stigma
of having a loved one in jail, are also deprived of the detainee’s financial
support.50 Many detainees lose their jobs even if jailed for a short time,51 and

46.

47.

48.
49.
50.

See Bibas, supra note 45, at 2493; Colbert, supra note 34, at 400 (noting that “people accused
of crimes in the ten states that deny representation at the defendant’s initial bail
determination face delays, generally ranging from two to sixty days, before they obtain a
lawyer’s assistance”); Klein, supra note 44, at 293 & n.71 (noting that “prisoners, including
pretrial detainees, may be incarcerated in facilities far away from the district in which they
are tried,” which “can inhibit a defense attorney from consulting with the pretrial detainee,”
and providing an extreme example of a defendant awaiting trial who was moved from New
York to Texas).
See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 205 (1979) (noting that even after controlling for the “seriousness
of the offenses and other factors,” pretrial “[d]etainees were less likely to receive nolles than
were those who were released”); Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 7 (in a survey of state
pretrial release and detention in the seventy-five largest U.S. counties, finding that sixty
percent of released defendants were later convicted as compared to seventy-eight percent of
detained defendants); sources cited supra note 44.
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 45, at 2492 (noting that “pretrial detention can approach or even
exceed the punishment that a court would impose after trial”).
Scott, supra note 44, at 15.
BEELEY, supra note 8, at 60 (noting that pretrial detention “imposes an unjust burden upon
the prisoner’s dependents”); Baradaran, supra note 20, at 770 n.245 (describing
congressional and judicial recognition of the burdens pretrial detention places on families).

1356

pretrial detention and the right to be monitored

this deprivation can continue after the detainee’s release. Without income, the
defendant and his family also may fall behind on payments and lose housing,
transportation, and other basic necessities.52 More broadly, the removal of
productive workers from the labor pool negatively affects the economy. As
Attorney General Holder recently noted, nonviolent defendants “could be
released . . . and allowed to pursue or maintain employment, and participate in
educational opportunities and their normal family lives—without risk of
endangering their fellow citizens or fleeing from justice.”53
3. The Tax Burden
High pretrial detention rates do not only impose high costs on defendants,
but also on the public. During the recent economic downturn, the cost of
money bail to society has been raised as a more practical rallying flag for
reform.54 The American Bar Association notes that “the taxpayer implications
of pretrial detention are significant given the expenses of operating detention
facilities,” observing that “New York City spends approximately $45,000
annually to house a single pre-trial detainee.”55
Accurately assessing the exact costs of pretrial detention is itself difficult.
Fixed costs of prisons must include the expense of housing both convicted
criminals and pretrial detainees, and it is difficult to identify the point at which
the number of pretrial detainees, in isolation, forces construction of a new

51.

52.

53.
54.

55.

See, e.g., A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 5 (listing “job loss, inability to pay child support
and eviction” as collateral consequences of pretrial confinement); Laura Sullivan,
Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed with Inmates, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:00
P.M.),
http://www.npr.org/2010/01/21/122725771/Bail-Burden-Keeps-U-S-Jails-Stuffed
-With-Inmates (noting that a defendant charged with stealing a television had lost his job,
apartment, and truck while detained pretrial).
See Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who Can’t Make Bail Face Stark Options, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan.
22, 2010, 12:00 A.M.), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725819
(describing a defendant whose child’s mother has not been able to pay the bills without his
income).
Holder, supra note 2.
Cost concerns were also a focus of earlier scholarship. See, e.g., Angel et al., supra note 39, at
354-55 (noting that the per diem cost of supporting a prisoner in Massachusetts increased
fifty percent between 1965 and 1968 and that added procedural steps further increase the
cost of preventative detention); McCarthy & Wahl, supra note 20, at 721-22 (noting that,
including fixed and variable costs of imprisonment, “the average daily per-prisoner cost may
be as high as $7.00 for men and $11.00 for women,” and highlighting other costs).
A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 5.
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facility. It is clear, though, that some states and counties have had to build new
jails to accommodate burgeoning populations. The Baltimore City Detention
Center, for example, in which ninety percent of women held are awaiting trial,
is planning a new $181 million facility to accommodate more inmates.56 The
variable costs of pretrial detention are somewhat better known. Although they
differ by jurisdiction, the costs of feeding, clothing, securitizing, and providing
medical care for millions of pretrial defendants are high. Daily estimates range
from $50 in Kentucky57 to $85 in Florida58 and $123 in New York.59 Additional
estimates suggest that jail costs range from $84 million60 to $124 million61 or
even $860 million62 annually.
B. The Problems with Money Bail
The broad liberty and privacy implications of pretrial detention are
somewhat easy to pinpoint: individuals presumed innocent are deprived of
most freedom of motion and interaction with family and community, they are
subjected to deplorable privacy intrusions, and they face a higher likelihood of
prolonged liberty deprivations. The specific harms of money bail are also
deeply problematic, however, and have been explored and analyzed in-depth
since the early twentieth century.63

56.

57.
58.
59.

60.

61.
62.
63.
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Fact Sheet: When More Is Less: How a Larger Women’s Jail in Baltimore Will Reduce Public
Safety and Diminish Resources for Positive Social Investments, JUST. POL’Y INST. 2 (Jan. 2011),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/11-01_REP_WhenMoreisLess_MD-AC.pdf.
A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 6.
Editorial, In Pretrial Debate, Listen to Sheriffs, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 26, 2011, http://tbo
.com/list/news-opinion-editorials/in-pretrial-debate-listen-to-sheriffs-202449.
Cost of Pre-Trial Detention in City Jails Takes Bite out of Big Apple’s Budget, N.Y.C. INDEP.
BUDGET OFF., http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/newsfax/nws56pretrialdetention.html (last visited
Sept. 3, 2013); see also UT Dallas Study to Help Curb Jail Costs, Cut Repeat Offenses, U. TEX.
DALL. NEWS CENTER (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.utdallas.edu/news/2011/12/1-14451_UT
-Dallas-Study-to-Help-Curb-Jail-Costs-Cut-Repeat_article-wide.html (estimating $57 in
daily costs per inmate in Dallas County).
Stacia Willson, Bexar County Jail Inmates Cost Taxpayers More than $80 Million, KENS5
SAN ANTONIO (Jan. 5, 2011, 7:48 AM), http://www.kens5.com/news/Bexar-County-Jail
-population-is-costing-tax-payers-more-than-80-million-112918419.html.
UT Dallas Study to Help Curb Jail Costs, Cut Repeat Offenses, supra note 59.
Cost of Pre-Trial Detention in City Jails Takes Bite out of Big Apple’s Budget, supra note 59.
See, e.g., BEELEY, supra note 8, at 164-71 (criticizing the bail system and proposing solutions);
RONALD GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO 33-50 (1975) (describing problems with
the bail system and concluding that it should be abandoned); PAUL BERNARD WICE, BAIL
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1. Wealth Discrimination
Just as scholars have long noted the inequalities faced by defendants
detained pretrial and those rich enough to be released, they have documented
how money bail specifically contributes to this divide, observing in 1927, for
example, that “[t]he amount of bail in a given case is determined arbitrarily
and with little or no regard to the . . . financial ability of the accused.”64 A later
survey of the Philadelphia bail system concluded:
One purpose for imposing a higher [bail] amount which would be
consistent with the theory of bail would be that the increase in the
defendant’s financial stake reduces the likelihood of non-appearance at
his trial. In practice, however, higher bail usually means that
appearance in court is being obtained by holding the defendant behind
bars.65
A 1956 New York project observed similar inequalities, noting that even at a
seemingly low bail amount of $500, “only three out of four defendants
obtained pre-trial release, while at $7500 and above only one defendant in
seven [was] able to post bail.”66 Yet for the felony prosecutions studied— 2,292
of which involved the setting of bail—69 cases were set at $7,500, and many

AND ITS REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY 14, 22-23 (1973)

64.
65.
66.

(criticizing “overcrowding” and other
pretrial detention problems driven by the bail system and noting that “[o]ne of the most
ironic aspects of the bail-setting procedure is that the factor explored least frequently by the
judge has the greatest impact on the defendant’s ability to secure pretrial release—his
financial status and the amount of bail he can afford to pay”); Caleb Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pt. 1), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 995-96 (1965) (criticizing bail
fixed at unaffordable amounts); McCarthy & Wahl, supra note 20, at 721 (critically noting
the potentially long duration of pretrial detention); Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of
Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 383-84 (1970)
(noting that the burdens of pretrial detention include “the diminished ability to prepare
one’s defense . . . and . . . severe economic hardships for the accused and his family”); Note,
Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1067 (1954) (criticizing the commercial bail system); Field Study, A Study of the
Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 718 (1958) (criticizing the bail
system).
BEELEY, supra note 8, at 155.
Note, supra note 63, at 1033.
Field Study, supra note 63, at 694, 708. All monetary bail amounts described here were set
for individual defendants.
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more cases (732) were set at points “at which most defendants cannot post bail”
($2,500 and above).67
Unfortunately, these conditions have not meaningfully changed: in a study
of data from 1990 to 2004, the Bureau of Justice Statistics noted a “direct
relationship between the bail amount and the probability of release.”68 When
bail was set at $100,000 or more, only one in ten defendants was released; at
bail amounts between $10,000 and $24,999, approximately forty-five percent
of defendants who received bail were released; and only when bail dropped to
$5,000-$9,999 did more than fifty percent of defendants who received bail
obtain release.69 Simply put, defendants without assets cannot obtain bail. As
the American Bar Association concludes, “Detaining persons simply because
they cannot afford bail is unwarranted . . . .”70 Despite the growing criticisms,
judges in most states still do exactly that.71
2. Direct Financial Burdens on Defendants and Their Families
Even if a defendant is able to post bail and avoid pretrial detention, the
result is often disastrous financially. Although bail is sometimes based on a
defendant’s ability to pay, it is also largely determined by fixed bail schedules,72
which assign specific monetary amounts based on the charges lodged. This
often forces indigent defendants and their families to spend money that
otherwise would have covered basic necessities. The many challenges faced in
this uphill battle of collecting adequate funds for bail are in some cases
dramatic: in Wisconsin, for example, police allegedly confiscated the bail
money that a family had managed to piece together through loans from friends
and co-workers and various ATM visits because the police believed that the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 694, 707-08.
Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 1, 3.
Id.
A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 5.
See infra note 72.
See Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial Release Policies, Practices
and Outcomes, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 7 (2010), http://www.pretrial.org/wpfb-file/pji-pretrial
-justice-in-america-a-survey-of-county-pretrial-release-policies-practices-and-outcomes
-2010-pdf (showing that sixty-four percent of counties participating in a survey use bail
schedules); Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST.
12 (2011) (documenting widespread use of bail schedules).
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money collected was connected to the drug activity with which the defendant
was charged.73
In sum, money bail and the high pretrial detention rates associated with
this antiquated system impose high burdens on defendants, families, and
society. This tragedy is not unavoidable, but rather has been perpetuated
despite the availability of technology to meaningfully enhance equality,
privacy, and liberty, and at a much lower cost than the current system.
C. Not Worth the Cost: The Ineffectiveness of Money Bail
From a bird’s-eye view of the U.S. system of money bail and associated
pretrial detention for flight, one might assume that the high burdens imposed
by this system are justified by its effectiveness—or perhaps a lack of feasible
alternatives.74 In fact, however, neither effectiveness nor a lack of alternatives
justifies this costly system.
A non-negligible percentage of defendants flee despite having posted large
bonds. In the seventy-five largest counties in the country, twenty-one to
twenty-four percent of state court felony defendants who were released on bail
or personal recognizance between 1990 and 2004 failed to appear at trial.75
Twenty-five percent of the defendants who failed to appear had been released
on surety bond;76 of all defendants released on surety bond during this time,
there was an eighteen percent failure to appear rate.77 While this failure rate
was lower than that of defendants on emergency release (forty-five percent of
defendants released on an emergency basis failed to appear) and unsecured
bonds (thirty percent of those released under this type of bond failed to
appear),78 it shows that bail bonds of any type do not perfectly achieve their

73.

74.

75.
76.

77.
78.

Radley Balko, Under Asset Forfeiture Law, Wisconsin Cops Confiscate Families’ Bail Money,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2012, 8:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/20
/asset-forfeiture-wisconsin-bail-confiscated_n_1522328.html.
Cf. Shawn J. Bayern, False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law and Economics, 86 TUL.
L. REV. 135, 142 (2011) (observing that an activity “may well be more efficient than its
absence but significantly less efficient than its alternatives”).
Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 8.
Id. at 8 (showing a total of 54,485 defendants who failed to appear, including 13,411
defendants who had been released on surety bond). Of those defendants who had been
released on personal recognizance, 20,883 failed to appear. Id.
Id.
Id.
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goal of ensuring a defendant’s presence at trial; the system tolerates a relatively
high level of failure as compared to the alternative of jailing all individuals,
which would guarantee nearly perfect appearance rates.
This failure is likely due to flight incentives that remain despite
technological advances in tracking and monitoring defendants. Although there
is no longer as high a likelihood of avoiding conviction by escaping across a
state or county line, as the police will eventually detect and track down the
defendant,79 the temptation remains. The common use of fixed bail schedules80
contributes to the problem: in addition to placing unfair burdens on indigent
defendants charged with pricey crimes, it leaves rich defendants charged with
the same crime in a relatively easy financial condition. A crime with a fixed bail
rate of $50,000 is expensive for a poor man, in other words, but relatively
cheap for someone with adequate funds. The wealthier individual may not
think twice about absconding and forever forfeiting these funds, particularly if
the alternative—a long jail sentence—has a particularly high cost.
In commercial bail states, individuals may also be incentivized to flee
despite low chances of success because their bondsmen have insufficient
incentives to monitor them. In the majority of states that allow commercial
sureties, the system relies largely on private entities to track down individuals
and ensure their appearance at trial. The defendant pays the bondsman a
percentage of the bail set as a fee, often along with additional collateral, and the
bondsman posts the bail.81 Depending on the size of the collateral, even
defendants of reasonable means may have relatively little incentive to stay in a
jurisdiction.82 Bondsmen, in turn, will only worry about funds that they have
put down to the extent they think that the court will collect it upon the
defendant’s failure to appear. Yet many courts have been lax about declaring
bonds forfeited when defendants flee, thus allowing bondsmen to keep the

79.

80.
81.
82.

See, e.g., Paul D. Schultz, The Future Is Here: Technology in Police Departments, POLICE
CHIEF, June 2008, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?article_id
=1527&fuseaction=display&issue_id=62008 (noting that police “can locate a fleeing fugitive
or a missing child in a field in a matter of minutes”).
See supra note 72.
Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 4 (showing that defendants “usually” pay “10% of the bail
amount” as a fee).
See Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 23 (2008)
(noting that “to inhibit future illegality, the defendant must expect that on forfeiture of the
bond, the surety will seek to recover from the defendant the total forfeited amount,” but
that in California, “the statutory scheme does not favor forfeiture”).
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money and reducing private incentives to monitor defendants.83
D. Traditional Alternatives to Money Bail
Unfortunately, the non-technological alternatives to money bail, which are
often proposed as options to reduce the inequality, liberty, and privacy burdens
associated with bail and pretrial detention, are similarly ineffective. Studies
suggest that release on personal recognizance—a promise by the defendant that
he will appear—is, unsurprisingly, less effective in securing presence at trial.84
Pretrial supervised release programs, which couple release without bond with
different combinations of, inter alia, required check-ins, travel and curfew
restrictions, monitoring, and/or treatment and classes, can be highly effective,
and for many bail reform advocates they have been the preferred option.85 But
because these programs typically rely on humans for supervision, job training,
drug treatment courses, and sometimes for their monitoring, they can also be
expensive86 and limited in the number of defendants that they can accept.
Persuading policymakers to increase funding, often in the face of opposition
from the bond industry, has in many cases been difficult or impossible,
resulting in the current, bad situation. An inexpensive, effective alternative to
money bail does—or likely soon will—exist, however, in the form of
technological monitoring.

83.

84.

85.

86.

See, e.g., Kevin Krause & Ed Timms, Dallas Bail Bondsman Reported Clients Rearrested
to Avoid Losses But Didn’t Provide Documentation, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 4,
2011, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/dallas/headlines/20111204-dallas
-bail-bondsman-falsely-reports-defendants-rearrested-to-avoid-losses.ece (observing that
in Dallas County “[c]urrent and former bail bondsmen and attorneys authorized to write
bonds owed the county $35 million in unpaid judgments”).
See, e.g., Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 8 (showing that between 1990 and 2004, of the
54,485 state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest U.S. counties who failed to appear
at trial, 20,883 had been released on recognizance).
See Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 5 (showing that more than 300 pretrial release
programs operated in the United States in 2001); A.B.A. Study, supra note 2 (supporting
pretrial release); cf. BEELEY, supra note 8, at 169 (proposing, before pretrial release programs
had been established, that “the services of social workers” be available to indigent
defendants to provide “assistance to the accused or his dependents”).
See, e.g., Office of Program Policy Analysis & Gov’t Accountability, Report No. 10-08: Pretrial
Release Programs’ Compliance with New Reporting Requirements Is Mixed, FLA. LEGISLATURE 2
(Jan. 2010), http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/1008rpt.pdf (noting
that “the amount of funds provided by local governments to . . . [pretrial release] programs
ranged from $65,000 in Bay County to $5.2 million in Broward County”).
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ii. electronic monitoring as an alternative
Increasingly advanced technologies are able to closely monitor pretrial
defendants’ locations while granting them far greater freedom—and with it the
opportunity to continue working, consult with attorneys, and spend time with
their families.87 Indeed, in recent years U.S. and international jurisdictions
have deployed monitoring technologies both pretrial and post-trial for
thousands of defendants.88 While these monitoring programs, described in
greater detail below, represent a promising start, electronic monitoring has yet
to meaningfully supplant pretrial detention for flight risk. There are numerous
obstacles to that goal, including practical concerns as well as the likelihood of
entrenched opposition from the bail industry. With this in mind, after
describing existing technologies and programs, this Part addresses likely
concerns about monitoring’s effectiveness, costs, and impact upon liberty,
privacy, and equality. These issues will have legal significance, because, as
developed in Part III, both the statutory and constitutional arguments for a
right to monitoring depend on demonstrating that monitoring is at least as
effective and inexpensive as money bail.89
A. Technologies and Implementation
Defendants and offenders in the United States and Europe have been
electronically monitored since the 1980s, and monitoring has since spread to a
limited number of other countries.90 As early as 1983, one judge required an
offender in New Mexico to be confined to his home and monitored with an
electronic bracelet that sent signals to his home,91 and in 1985, Palm Beach

87.
88.
89.
90.

91.

See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 38, at 1362 (describing the benefits of pretrial release).
See infra text accompanying notes 98-112.
See infra text accompanying notes 182-184.
See George Mair, Electronic Monitoring in England and Wales: Evidence-Based or Not?, 5 CRIM.
JUST. 257, 259, 262 (2005) (indicating that monitoring technology has been used in the
United Kingdom since 1989 and is also now used in Israel, Singapore, and New Zealand);
Mike Nellis, Surveillance and Confinement: Explaining and Understanding the Experience of
Electronically Monitored Curfews, 1 EUR. J. PROBATION 41, 41 (2009) (explaining that
electronic monitoring began in the United States in 1982, “spread to Canada and Australia,
is now widely used in Western Europe, and is taking root in Eastern Europe”).
J. Robert Lilly & Richard A. Ball, A Brief History of House Arrest and Electronic Monitoring, 13
N. KY. L. REV. 343, 362 (1987).
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County deployed one of the first electronic monitoring programs using radio
beepers—for convicted, not pretrial, defendants.92 Indeed, although it is
counterintuitive, as monitoring seems better suited for locating fugitives than
controlling their behavior,93 electronic monitoring is more widely used in
sentencing.94
Nonetheless, electronic monitoring has a long history of pretrial use. In the
late 1980s, Marion County, Indiana, ran an experimental program of pretrial
home detention and electronic monitoring for those who could not afford bail
or meet release on personal recognizance conditions. Discussing the benefits of
the Marion County program, Indiana University professors note that “awaiting
trial at home is less restrictive than confinement in jail” and that the program
allowed “offenders to maintain employment and ties to their families.”95 And
in 1991, Federal Pretrial Services began a national, pretrial home confinement
programming using electronic monitoring.96 Monitoring was introduced in
Europe around the same time.97
Current electronic monitoring technologies take several forms. In Europe,
the most common monitoring systems use radio devices combined with home

92.

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.

See Annesley K. Schmidt, The Use of Electronic Monitoring by Criminal Justice Agencies in the
United States 1988, in THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF OFFENDERS 9, 9 (Ken Russell & J.
Robert Lilly eds., 1989). By 1988, thirty-two states had implemented electronic monitoring
programs that followed 2,300 people, although only 4.6% of them were pretrial detainees or
defendants awaiting an appeal. Id. at 10, 15; see also Keith W. Cooprider & Judith Kerby, A
Practical Application of Electronic Monitoring at the Pretrial Stage, FED. PROBATION, Mar.
1990, at 28, http://www.19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/resources/Documents/Smaart/StaffPub
-PretrialElectronicMonitoring_0390.pdf (describing a pretrial electronic monitoring
program in Lake County, Illinois, instituted in 1986).
See supra note 19.
Pat Best, Curfew/Electronic Monitoring: The Northern Ireland Experience, 6 IRISH PROBATION J.
91, 92 (2009) (explaining that in the late 2000s sixteen European jurisdictions used
electronic monitoring “mostly as additional requirements to community orders or as part of
early or post release from custody,” and noting that four European jurisdictions use
monitoring in pretrial/bail curfew arrangements). In the United States, 100,000 individuals
are monitored daily. Mike Nellis, Electronic Monitoring: Exploring the Commercial Dimension,
58 CRIM. JUST. MATTERS 12, 12 (2008).
Michael G. Maxfield & Terry L. Baumer, Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring:
Comparing Pretrial and Postconviction Programs, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 521, 523 (1990).
Beginnings of Probation and Pretrial Services, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov
/FederalCourts/ProbationPretrialServices/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
See Joseph Hughes, You’re Tagged, J.L. SOC’Y SCOT., Nov. 1, 2003, http://www
.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/48-11/1000631.aspx (describing monitoring as originating in
Europe in Britain in 1989).
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curfews.98 In continuous-signal curfewed monitoring systems,99 individuals
wear a tag on their ankle, which sends a signal to a receiver attached to the
individual’s phone.100 The individual is typically confined to the home during
certain hours, and a 24-hour monitoring center, using data from the receiver,
can track when the individual is at home and whether the equipment has been
tampered with.101 Other monitoring does not rely on confinement to the home
but rather requires periodic check-ins through “voice verification” or another
means of proving location.102 In the United States, Federal Pretrial Services
uses both radio and GPS tracking devices to enforce home confinement and
other conditions of supervised release,103 along with frequent, required

98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Nellis, supra note 90, at 41; see also Jennifer Airs et al., Electronically Monitored
Curfew as a Condition of Bail—Report of the Pilot, HOME OFF., at v (2000),
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/5593953/2064697648/name/occ-bail+research+development
+and+statistical+directorate.pdf (describing a 1989-1990 bail EM-curfew pilot program in
England that tagged approximately 173 individuals). About twenty years later,
“approximately 3,500 adults were subject to an electronically monitored curfew bail
condition at any one time” in England and Wales. Anthea Hucklesby, Keeping the Lid on the
Prison Remand Population: The Experience in England and Wales, 21 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM.
JUST. 3, 12 (2009). In Northern Ireland, judges can similarly require curfews, tagging, and a
home monitoring unit. Best, supra note 94, at 94. Scottish law allows judges to offer
electronic monitoring as a bail condition if bail is denied, Report on the Use of Bail and
Remand, SENT’G COMM’N FOR SCOT. 9 (2005), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource
/Doc/925/0116775.pdf, and a 2005 electronic monitoring bail pilot curfewed and monitored
sixty-three individuals, Monica Barry et al., An Evaluation of the Use of Electronic Monitoring
as a Condition of Bail in Scotland, SCOT. EXECUTIVE SOC. RES., at iii (2007), http://
www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/179989/0051173.pdf. A similar three-year pilot in
Portugal monitored thirty-nine pretrial defendants. José Ricardo Nunes, The Portuguese Pilot
Project on Electronic Monitoring, in WILL ELECTRONIC MONITORING HAVE A FUTURE IN
EUROPE? 155, 155, 157 (Markus Mayer et al. eds., 2003). In several of these programs, a
private monitoring company was responsible for checking defendants’ compliance. Airs et
al., supra, at 24; Best, supra note 94, at 94.
See Mike Nellis, The Electronic Monitoring of Offenders in England and Wales, 31 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 165, 166 (1991) (introducing the term).
DICK WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET: TECHNOLOGY AND OFFENDER SUPERVISION app. at
122 (2001).
Id.
Timothy P. Cadigan, Electronic Monitoring in Federal Pretrial Release, FED. PROBATION, Mar.
1991, at 28-29.
Location Monitoring/Home Confinement (Tether Program), U.S. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY E.D.
MICH., http://www.miept.uscourts.gov/pages/monitoring.cfm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
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interactions with supervising officers.104 Cook County, Illinois, has used
electronic monitoring—a radio signal and home monitoring unit—for more
than 250,000 non-violent defendants since 1989, some of whom were released
in the pretrial context.105
House-arrest models, however, are both more restrictive and, when not
combined with real-time monitoring, likely less effective106 than the active
tracking107 of individuals using GPS satellite technology, which has become
more common in recent years.108 Mesa, Arizona, for example, releases and
electronically monitors certain defendants pretrial using GPS satellite tracking
devices.109 And Strafford County, New Hampshire, tracks certain defendants
on pretrial release (as well as sentenced offenders in community supervision)
using GPS systems that allow “officials to know within 10 meters where a
person has been throughout the day.”110 Private firms have also begun to offer

104.

105.
106.

107.

108.

109.
110.

See Supervision, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/ProbationPretrial
Services/Supervision.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (stating that “[w]ith location
monitoring, the court determines the extent to which people are restricted case by case,
requiring some individuals to remain on 24-hour-a-day lockdown at home and allowing
others to leave for preapproved and scheduled absences” and describing “frequent phone
calls” and “frequent, unannounced face-to-face visits” from supervising officers).
Electronic Monitoring, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF, http://www.cookcountysheriff.org/dcsi
/electronicmonitoring.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
See, e.g., United States v. Parahams, No. 3:13-CR-005, 2013 WL 683494, at *5 (N.D. Ind.
Feb. 25, 2013) (“[T]he monitoring equipment generally sends a signal when its wearer
travels outside of a preprogrammed range from the transmitter. But that does not mean it
tracks the exact whereabouts of the wearer once he or she goes out of range.”); Nat’l Inst. of
Justice, Electronic Monitoring Reduces Recidivism, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2 (Sept. 2011),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234460.pdf (finding electronic monitoring via GPS
more effective than radio monitoring in reducing the “failure to comply” rate for released
felons).
Schmidt, supra note 92, at 15. Passive monitoring likely has less potential as a bail substitute,
as it does not provide live location data to aid in a fugitive’s recovery. See generally
Supervision, supra note 104 (describing passive GPS systems).
Best, supra note 94, at 92; Electronic Monitoring, MERRIMACK COUNTY, N.H.,
http://www.merrimackcounty.net/pretrial/monitoring.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013)
(describing the use of electronic monitoring for pretrial defendants in a county in New
Hampshire, including GPS monitoring); The Pretrial Process, MERRIMACK COUNTY, N.H.,
http://www.merrimackcounty.net/pretrial/process.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (same).
Electronic Monitoring Program, MESA, ARIZ., http://www.mesaaz.gov/court/electronic
monitoring.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
XML, GPS, RF: New-Age Crime Fighters, 43 SECURITY, May 2006, at 40.
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GPS monitoring to help wealthy defendants avoid pretrial detention.111
Although active monitoring can be limited by the availability of the cellular
telephone networks through which the device transmits location data,112 it
appears to be the best current option for both defendants and governments: its
accuracy deters flight and allows fugitives to be readily located, and it is much
less restrictive than a curfew requirement. Indeed, at least for relatively lowrisk defendants, it potentially need only be actively (as opposed to periodically)
monitored once a defendant has failed to appear for trial. And other
technologies may emerge in the near future. The advent of phones capable of
mobile videoconferencing and Google Glass,113 for example, suggests that live
audio-video monitoring may be a possibility in the future, presumably for the
highest flight risk defendants.
B. Effectiveness
One concern about the use of monitoring technology in lieu of pretrial
detention for failure to post bond is purely practical: that it will never be totally
effective at eliminating failures to appear.114 Of course, the effectiveness of any
given monitoring program at reducing flight risk is an empirical question, and
while, as discussed below, existing technology shows promise, no conclusive
empirical evidence of effectiveness currently exists (and with respect to future
innovations, obviously cannot). The sparse empirical studies addressing the

111.

112.

113.
114.

See William Saletan, Get Out of Jail Unfree, SLATE (June 1, 2011, 11:11 AM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/06/get_out_of_jail_unfree
.html.
See GPS: Your Supervising Officer Is Watching, U.S. CTS.: THIRD BRANCH
NEWS, http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/07-04-01/GPS_Your_Supervising
_Officer_is_Watching.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (noting that, in Maine, “[a]ctive GPS
is difficult because large areas of the state have poor cell phone service”). This will become
less of a problem as cellular service continues to improve. It can also be surmounted, albeit
more expensively, through the use of satellite phones. See, e.g., Irridium EXTREME Satellite
Phone with GPS, SATTRANS, http://www.sattransusa.com/irid-pho-9575.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2013) (“The new phone works anywhere on Earth and provides the most reliable
voice, data and location-based GPS satellite service in remote areas.”).
Google Glass: What It Does, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/glass/start/what-it-does (last
visited Sept. 3, 2013).
See, e.g., Eric Maes & Benjamin Mine, Some Reflections on the Possible Introduction of Electronic
Monitoring as an Alternative to Pre-Trial Detention in Belgium, 52 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 144,
150-57 (2013) (arguing that electronic monitoring is costly and raises a host of legal issues,
privacy concerns, and execution challenges).
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cost and effectiveness of monitoring have, as a result of the predominance of
post-conviction monitoring, focused largely on that context.115 In the United
States, there are few studies of the effectiveness of monitoring pretrial, and the
limited research available tends to involve small sample sizes.116 Federal courts
have generally been positive in their assessment of the Federal Pretrial Services
location-based implementation of monitoring,117 although, as noted above, it is
typically combined with a high degree of supervision.118
The European literature is slightly richer, although still inconclusive. In a
pilot study conducted in England between 1998 and 1999, judges imposed
conditional bail with monitored curfews119 on a select group of defendants—in
some cases, directly in lieu of pretrial detention.120 Of the 173 individuals who
received monitoring curfews, researchers collected data on 118 individuals,
eleven of whom absconded121—a failure to appear rate “lower than national and
local figures” for other forms of bail.122 Other European studies suggest

115.

116.

117.

118.
119.

120.
121.
122.

Best, supra note 94, at 93 (noting that “there are very few published studies on the
effectiveness of EM”); Hucklesby, supra note 19, at 55 (noting that the “evidence base” on
the effectiveness of monitoring “relies almost exclusively on evidence undertaken by or for
the Home Office” and focuses on a limited set of issues).
See, e.g., Cadigan, supra note 102, at 26, 29-30 (noting that failure-to-appear rates of
electronically monitored defendants were higher than those released on bail in one study,
but that electronic monitoring tended to be used for the highest-risk defendants); see also
WILLIAM BALES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 6 (2010) (noting that even Cadigan’s study
lacked statistical controls); cf. Schmidt, supra note 92, at 17 (noting that officials provided
very different statistics for success rates).
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 814-16 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing reduction
in flight rate from monitoring program but concluding that “evidence concerning the
effectiveness of the bracelet alone only arguably rebuts the presumption of flight”). But see
United States v. Parahams, No. 3:13-CR-005, 2013 WL 683494, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 25,
2013) (noting limitations of federal monitoring).
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Judicial decisions affecting pretrial defendants in Europe are called “remand,” the three
main types of which include “in custody [pretrial detention], conditional bail, and
unconditional bail.” Airs et al., supra note 98, at v.
Id. at vi (concluding that bail was a “true alternative” to detention in more than half of the
cases studied).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 60. Concerns raised included, among others, objections from the police that they had
to maintain responsibility for the defendants, whereas jail officials would have otherwise
taken over these duties. Id. at vi. Some technical problems with the equipment also
emerged. Id. at 48.
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potentially positive results, although, again, not producing any firm empirical
conclusions. In Portugal, very early results of a small pilot of a bail curfew and
electronic monitoring program showed “no relevant non-compliances, nor
revoked orders” in 2002, from a total of 39 participants.123 In Scotland,
however, a study of the country’s bail monitoring pilot showed more
compliance problems; in 31 of the 63 monitored bail orders completed,
defendants were accused of breaching bail conditions or committing new
offenses.124
Studies of post-trial monitoring in Europe and the United States also
suggest potential success in terms of individuals completing their programs
without recidivating.125 These statistics are not easily compared with the ability
of monitoring to prevent flight, however—the core purpose of the monitoring
proposed here.
Further study—particularly of the use of active GPS tracking in place of
pretrial detention—will be essential to convincing wary judges and legislators.
But the potential of advanced tracking technology to reduce flight risk and aid
in fugitive recovery appears enormous. Anecdotally, this intuition is supported
by the use of GPS monitors by bondsmen themselves,126 as well as by recent
high-profile examples of GPS monitoring as an alternative or addition to bail,
including for arms dealers, gangsters, and financial fraudsters.127 A judge
initially ordered Bernie Madoff, for example, to wear a GPS monitoring ankle

123.

124.

125.

126.
127.

Cristina Penedo, Evaluation of the Portuguese Electronic Monitoring Programme, in WILL
ELECTRONIC MONITORING HAVE A FUTURE IN EUROPE?, supra note 98, at 159, 161; see also
Nunes, supra note 98, at 157 (documenting the Portuguese study).
Barry et al., supra note 98, at iii-iv. The authors noted, however, that judges may have
required electronic monitoring for those most unlikely to comply with bail conditions. Id. at
60-61.
See, e.g., BALES ET AL., supra note 116, at x (finding that electronic monitoring reduced the
risk of failure under community supervision by thirty-one percent); WHITFIELD, supra note
100, at 13 (concluding, in the postconviction context, that monitoring has produced “some
consistent results . . . on both sides of the Atlantic,” with a success rate of around ninety
percent for post-trial monitoring during a period of two or fewer months); Nat’l Inst. of
Justice, supra note 106 (finding, in a study of Florida offenders, that electronic monitoring
significantly reduced the likelihood of failure under community supervision).
See infra notes 165-167.
Saletan, supra note 111, at 1 (citing monitoring deals made for “Saudi arms dealer Adnan
Kashoggi; U.S. arms dealer David Brooks; financial fraudster Marc Dreier; domestic-help
abusers Mahender and Varsha Sabhnani; John A. Gotti, son of the Gambino crime boss;
and Cameron Douglas, son of actor Michael Douglas”).
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bracelet in addition to paying $10 million in bail and remaining on nightly
house arrest.128 Dominique Strauss-Kahn was similarly granted bail and
assigned a GPS electronic ankle bracelet—along with house arrest, armed
guards, and “24-hour video monitoring of every door”—at Strauss-Kahn’s
expense,129 leading Slate magazine to the conclusion advanced here: “Most
defendants don’t run the International Monetary Fund. They don’t have
citizenship in non-extraditing countries or standing arrangements to board any
Air France flight. They don’t need guards to keep them from escaping justice.
They just need an ankle monitor.”130
Nonetheless, it might be argued that no amount of high-tech monitoring
will ever be as effective at ensuring a defendant’s presence at trial as detaining
the defendant (which is, of course, nearly 100% effective). As Blackstone
observed, defendants facing the most serious penalties could not be bailed
because of their great incentive to flee: “in . . . offenses of a capital nature, no
bail can be a security equivalent to the actual custody of the person. For what is
there that a man may not be induced to forfeit, to save his own life?”131 This
will almost certainly be true of monitoring as well. No matter how ingenious
the technology, it is likely that highly motivated defendants will find a way to
defeat it, perhaps by damaging or removing the tracking device or by blocking
its signal.132 Technology, then, cannot completely eliminate pretrial detention
for flight risk; at most, by being more effective than money bail, it could
narrow the class of defendants considered too great of a flight risk to release
(most of whom, under contemporary practice, would be detained for
dangerousness anyway). But this is not a particularly serious objection: the
principal beneficiaries of replacing money bail with monitoring are not those
who, facing serious charges, have too much at stake to be released, but those
who, facing less serious charges, simply have too little to stake. These concerns,

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Madoff Ordered to Wear Monitoring Ankle Bracelet, FOX NEWS, Dec. 17, 2008, http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,468504,00.html.
Saletan, supra note 111, at 1.
Id.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1001 (George Chase ed.,
Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1938) (1769).
See, e.g., Paige St. John, Tests Found Major Flaws in Parolee GPS Monitoring Devices, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/30/local/la-me-ff-gps-monitors
-20130331 (reporting a range of technical problems with GPS sex offender monitoring
equipment in California).
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moreover, can also be addressed by imposing higher penalties for failing to
appear while monitored or for tampering with a monitoring device.133
There will likely be missteps, in the form of malfunctioning technology and
fugitive defendants, along the way to widespread deployment as an alternative
to pretrial detention.134 But, in the near term, it has the potential to effectively
replace unmeetable monetary requirements for non-dangerous defendants.
Technology might not be able to completely eliminate detention for flight risk,
but it should be able to eliminate detention for poverty.
C. Cost
As the American Bar Association and other organizations have begun to
emphasize the expense of pretrial detention,135 the practical benefits of the
technological alternative have become even more compelling. Increasingly
computerized, they do not require the staff, medical programs, and vast
security controls of pretrial detention. Monitoring programs appear to generate
significant savings if used in place of pretrial detention, although some of the
savings may be lost if convicted defendants are not given time-served credit for
time-monitored, and thus eventually spend the same amount of time
incarcerated.136
Pretrial services programs that combine technology with relatively
inexpensive monitoring have substantially reduced the financial cost of
preventing flight. Miami-Dade County cut costs from approximately $20,000
per pretrial defendant to $432 annually for released, monitored defendants,137

133.

134.
135.

136.
137.
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See, e.g., Electronic Monitoring Program, supra note 109 (noting that tampering with a
monitoring device is a felony). In the parole context, California is considering increasing the
penalty for tampering with a monitoring device. See Heather Tirado Gilligan, More Parolees
Tamper with Ankle Monitoring Bracelets, CAL. HEALTH REP. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://
www.healthycal.org/archives/11068.
See supra note 132 (discussing problems in California GPS monitoring of sex offenders).
See A.B.A. Study, supra note 2; Pretrial Justice: Problem and Solution, PRETRIAL
JUST. INST., http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/Pretrial%20Justice%20Problem
%20Solution.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (noting high cost of pretrial detention).
But see FEELEY, supra note 47, at 205 (noting the lower conviction rate for released
defendants).
Shima Baradaran, The Right Way to Shrink Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/opinion/31baradaran.html; see also A.B.A. Study, supra note 2,
at 5 (noting the cost-saving potential of monitoring).
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and the Southern District of Iowa saved $1.7 million over one fiscal year by
releasing 15% more defendants.138 Federal active monitoring of pretrial
defendants in the 1990s cost approximately $2.77 to $9.04 daily,139 compared
to daily costs of pretrial detention ranging, according to some estimates, from
$50 to $123.140 Other estimates suggest that electronic monitoring programs
“[o]n average . . . cost between five and twenty-five dollars per day.”141 And
approximately one out of three offenders who were electronically monitored in
Florida between 2001 and 2007 would have otherwise been jailed at six times
the cost, according to one study, which concluded that monitoring was a “costeffective method of dealing with offenders.”142 Similarly, results from Europe
also suggest that monitoring can be far less expensive than other options if
implemented properly—ensuring that monitoring is implemented in lieu of
jail, thus offsetting costs.143
As GPS, live audiovisual monitoring, and other technologies become more
common outside of the criminal world for ease of navigation and of sharing life
experiences with friends and family, costs likely will continue to decline, while
effectiveness will rise. Governments need not operate the programs
themselves: already, multiple competing private providers exist (and one could
imagine bond agents, some of whom already use tracking devices, becoming
monitoring agents).144 The cost-effectiveness of a monitoring program, of

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

144.

A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 5.
Cadigan, supra note 102, at 29.
Supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
Natasha Alladina, The Use of Electronic Monitoring in the Alaska Criminal Justice System: A
Practical Yet Incomplete Alternative to Incarceration, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 144 (2011).
BALES ET AL., supra note 116, at 150-51.
Cf. Airs et al., supra note 98, at 55 (“Our cost calculations take into account an element to
cover the offsetting of remand against sentence.”). In the English 1989-1990 bail pilot study
introduced above, the researchers estimated that the use of bail curfews in lieu of pretrial
detention at the national level would save between £1.25 and £1.78 million annually,
depending on the percentage of defendants who would have otherwise been detained or
placed on other bail conditions. Id. at 57. But see Mike Nellis, Electronic Monitoring and the
Community Supervision of Offenders, in ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON: OPTIONS FOR AN INSECURE
SOCIETY 224, 234 (Anthony Bottoms et al. eds., 2004) (characterizing the study as finding
that because only half of the monitoring curfews were used on individuals “genuinely at risk
of custody,” monitoring would not produce cost savings). In Portugal, daily electronic
monitoring costs are estimated at €13.77, as opposed to €37.05 costs of daily imprisonment.
Nunes, supra note 98, at 158.
See KY. PRETRIAL SERVS., PRETRIAL REFORM IN KENTUCKY 6 (2013) (“Kentucky has no
funding to provide [electronic monitoring] services to defendants. As such, pretrial officers
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course, will depend on the details. A minimalist system, designed to track the
location only of those who have already failed to appear and giving at least
partial time-served credit, which is clearly more desirable from a privacy
perspective, will also be more cost-effective than a more intrusive program145
without credit. And, for better or worse, it is likely that monitoring programs
will shift pretrial flight prevention costs to defendants; some defendants in
pretrial release programs already pay for the cost of their own monitoring.146 If
electronic monitoring is implemented on a broader scale, more legislatures will
try to recoup the costs of monitoring from indigent defendants as they have
done with counsel147 and jail costs.148 As others have noted, this is deeply
problematic,149 but it is still preferable to detention (which defendants might
also have to pay for).
Empirically, the cost savings of monitoring in lieu of detention require
further detailed investigation. The goal here is not to suggest that monitoring
is completely effective or costless, but rather that the available data suggest that
it can be at least as cheap and effective as money bail.

145.
146.

147.

148.
149.

allow defendants to choose the provider . . . .”); St. John, supra note 132 (noting that
monitoring of offenders in California is awarded via a bidding process).
See, e.g., Supervision, supra note 104 (stating that “[s]upervising people on location” requires
“frequent phone calls” and visits).
See, e.g., Office of Program Policy Analysis & Gov’t Accountability, Report
No. 11-27: Pretrial Release Programs Generally Comply with Statutory Data Collection
Requirements, FLA. LEGISLATURE 2 (Dec. 2011), http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us
/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/1127rpt.pdf (noting that “programs most commonly
charged fees for electronic monitoring”); Pay Electronic Monitoring & Pretrial Program
Fees, DENVER DEP’T SAFETY, http://www.denvergov.org/safety/DepartmentofSafety
/AlternativeCorrections/CommunityCorrections/ElectronicMonitoring/PayClientFees/tabid
/443659/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (noting that fees are required for electronic
monitoring).
See, e.g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 42, 54 (1974) (affirming an order that a probationer
pay attorneys’ fees and investigative expenses incurred by the state in providing his
defense); Murphy, supra note 22, at 1371 n.259 (providing examples of “states [that] require
tracked individuals to pay for their tracking”).
Phil Willon, Riverside County to Make Inmates Pay Jail Costs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/20/local/la-me-inmate-fees-20111120.
See Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 14, 29), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2309093 (describing
“application fees” and “co-payments[s]” for appointment of counsel).
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D. Privacy and Net-Widening
Another, more fundamental set of reservations centers on privacy. The
degree to which a monitored defendant’s privacy is invaded depends on the
technology employed—a device that transmits location data only on the day of
a court appearance is less invasive than one that transmits constantly, and both
are far less invasive than a device that transmits audio and video. But even the
most limited version is a serious intrusion, and privacy concerns almost
certainly explain why monitoring technologies have not so far been widely
heralded by academics and criminal justice advocacy groups as a solution to the
serious and seemingly intractable problems with money bail and pretrial
detention described above. 150
Focusing solely on defendants who would otherwise be detained for failure
to post bond, privacy objections have little purchase. Even the most thorough
observation—even if it causes defendants to carefully monitor and restrict their
behavior in order to limit the government’s knowledge of their lives—would
for most defendants almost certainly be preferable to imprisonment. Agence
France-Presse, for example, described Strauss-Kahn’s ankle bracelet as a
“symbol of shame for the beleaguered global finance titan,”151 but even a highprofile figure like Strauss-Kahn apparently preferred shame (and constant
surveillance) to imprisonment. In one study of those subject to home curfew
and monitoring, the most common complaints voiced included “[n]ot being
able to go to the store when you want” and “[n]ot being able to go out to eat
when you want,” followed by “[h]aving to wear a visible monitor.”152 These are
significant deprivations, but, unsurprisingly, “most electronically monitored
offenders prefer house arrest to jail.”153 A fortiori, a less intrusive, curfew-less
monitoring regime would also be preferable to jail.
This calculus holds even if, leaving aside the tremendous increases in
liberty and physical and psychological well-being, privacy is used as the sole
criterion. Being in jail, after all, involves not only near-constant surveillance by

150.
151.
152.

153.

See, e.g., Maes & Mine, supra note 114, at 157 (exploring privacy concerns).
Strauss-Kahn Faces Ankle Bracelet Shame, INQUIRER, May 19, 2011, http://technology
.inquirer.net/542/strauss-kahn-faces-ankle-bracelet-shame.
Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, The Electronic Monitoring of Offenders Released from Jail
or Prison: Safety, Control, and Comparisons to the Incarceration Experience, 84 PRISON J. 413, 421
(2004).
Id. at 417.
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guards, but also by fellow inmates. And in the absence of other realistic options
for systemic reform, the perfect must not be the enemy of the good.
Not surprisingly, then, opposition to the use of monitoring technology has
largely focused not on those already subject to a high level of government
surveillance, but on the risk that technology will allow the government to
surveil more people154: ever cheaper and more powerful monitoring equipment
lessens resource constraints, and the physically unobtrusive nature of the
monitors themselves lessens political and constitutional opposition.155 These
net-widening concerns are slippery slope arguments—the use of monitoring in
a given context may not be bad in itself, but it will lead to the use of
monitoring in other, more objectionable contexts. And as Frederick Schauer
observed, slippery slope arguments are empirical arguments.156 Thus, the
question is whether the benefits of replacing pretrial detention for failure to
post bond will outweigh the harms from any resulting increase in the number
of people monitored. These net-widening concerns will be considered in two
parts, first across society at large, and then among pretrial defendants.
In many cases, of course, there is good reason to be skeptical of the
expanded use of surveillance and control technology in criminal justice.
Although the precise causes of our astoundingly large prison population are
disputed,157 the costs of physical imprisonment impose at least a weak restraint
on our desire to incarcerate. Technology eases that restraint, and since political
support for crime control measures remains strong, and the Supreme Court
has taken an extremely limited view of the privacy rights of those convicted of a

154.
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156.

157.

See, e.g., James Cannings, Electronic Monitoring: A Chief Probation Officer’s Perspective, in THE
ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF OFFENDERS, supra note 92, at 83, 85-89 (arguing that netwidening may occur if electronic monitoring is introduced in the post-trial context without
rigid guidelines).
Cf. Murphy, supra note 22 (observing that when individuals are restrained by GPS
monitoring and other non-physical methods, courts offer few constitutional protections).
Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 381 (1985) (observing that “a
persuasive slippery slope argument depends for its persuasiveness upon temporally and
spatially contingent empirical facts”); see also Hucklesby, supra note 98, at 11 (“There is no
accurate information about the extent to which net-widening occurs at the pre-trial stage as
a result of the introduction of initiatives to divert defendants from custody.”).
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010) (suggesting that
discrimination against African Americans is now accomplished through disproportionate
arrests, prosecution, and imprisonment); John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison
Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239 (2012) (describing many factors that contribute to the
large prison population in the United States).
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crime,158 this allows government to extend its control over a far wider group.
Thus, for example, as Wayne Logan159 and Erin Murphy160 have noted,
custodial “treatment” of dangerous sex offenders is quite expensive, but
monitoring is not,161 allowing non-dangerous offenders to be swept into the
net. For the many who, quite reasonably, think that government already exerts
too much control, particularly over vulnerable groups, concern over advancing
technology is generally justified.
Although the prospect of the government requiring all citizens to wear
ankle monitors or, worse, a pair of Google glasses that upload everything we
see and hear to the Internet, is indeed a frightening one, using monitoring in
lieu of detention is unlikely to move us meaningfully closer to that nightmare
scenario. Crucially, the expanded use of monitoring technology in the pretrial
context does not have the same potential to directly increase the number of
people subject to the power of the state–that is, the number of pretrial
defendants.162 This is because the costs of pretrial supervision of nondangerous defendants, whether in the form of traditional pretrial services
programs, monitoring, or detention, although sizeable, simply do not play a
meaningful role in determining the number of prosecutions. Relative to the
costs of maintaining police departments, prosecutors’ offices, and prisons (or
their future technological alternatives), they are a drop in the bucket. The same
may be said with respect to the political costs of maintaining a system in which
the potentially innocent are thrown in jail with convicts for lack of funds. Thus,
even a drastic reduction in the resource and political costs of pretrial
supervision would be unlikely to cause a measurable increase in the number of

158.
159.

160.

161.

162.

See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (upholding a warrantless search of a
probationer’s house on reasonable suspicion).
See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 149 (2000)
(expressing deep concerns about “the use of information and its dissemination to exercise
ongoing control over ex-offenders after they fulfill their penal obligations”).
Murphy, supra note 22, at 1367-68 (noting that “the economics of technological control
enable the regulation of greater numbers of persons under less stringent conditions for a
longer period of time and to a greater degree than an equivalent physical intrusion,”
including custody); id. at 1371 (“[T]he cost of imposing a technological restraint may
decrease over its period of use.”).
Logan, supra note 159, at 201 (noting that “emerging technologies carry additional promise
for intrusiveness”); id. at 177 (noting a recent shift toward “massive, impersonal
surveillance”).
But see Hucklesby, supra note 98, at 11 (noting concerns that efforts to reduce pretrial
detention could increase “the number of defendants” subjected to pretrial control but that
no empirical proof of this exists).
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criminal defendants. To be sure, as discussed below, it may affect the amount
or form of that supervision, but the size of the population potentially subject to
it will continue to be determined by larger factors, such as policing levels and
policies (and thus arrest rates) and incentives for charging rates within
prosecutors’ offices.
Nonetheless, there remains the worry that broader use of monitoring in the
pretrial context will lead to its expanded use in other contexts, including
probation and parole. As the supply of monitoring technologies increases,
competitive production expands, and manufacturers learn new and cheaper
production methods, the cost of monitoring is likely to shrink, making it
generally more appealing. More subtly, it could increase familiarity with, and
acceptance of, monitoring technology among both law enforcement and the
public. Although the rapid proliferation of location-tracking cell phones and
services arguably poses a far greater threat in this regard than pretrial
monitoring,163 this concern cannot be easily dismissed. Ultimately, while future
proposed uses of monitoring technology should be carefully scrutinized, this
necessarily somewhat vague threat should not prevent its use to help the very
real people currently in jail.
Turning to the narrower class of pretrial defendants eligible for release, the
risk is that expanding the use of monitoring as an alternative to detention will
lead to the increased use of monitoring on defendants who would previously
have been released on bail, personal recognizance, or other less restrictive
conditions.164 And, to some extent, it likely would: once a monitoring
infrastructure is in place, the marginal cost of adding to the monitored
population is likely to be relatively low, and if monitoring is more effective at
producing presence at trial than the alternatives, policymakers will have an
incentive to use it. As discussed above, expanded use will lead to greater
economies of scale. Moreover, increasing the demand for monitoring
technology may lead to a corresponding increase in the financial ability of its

163.

164.

Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The availability
and use of these and other new devices will continue to shape the average person’s
expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.”).
See, e.g., Mike Nellis, Electronic Tagging: Grounds for Resistance?, in THE ELECTRONIC
MONITORING OF OFFENDERS: SYMPOSIUM PAPERS, SECOND SERIES 20, 23 (J. Robert Lilly &
Joan Himan eds., 1991) (concluding that “[t]here is ample evidence that . . . [net-widening]
occurred with all the so-called alternatives to custody introduced in Britain since the 1960s”
but that “it is wrong to assume that it is inevitable”).
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producers to lobby governments for further expansion.165 These fears appear to
have been partially realized in England and Wales.166 Nonetheless, the
potential harms should not be overstated. Many defendants are likely to be
monitored in the future regardless of whether technology is used as a
replacement for flight-risk detention. Indeed, electronic monitoring by pretrial
services departments is increasingly imposed as an additional condition of
release, while private bondsmen have begun exploiting monitoring as a means
of protecting their investment.167 (As discussed in Part IV below, this is an
unsurprising outcome given the interests of both bondsmen and technology
purveyors in maximizing their profits.) To the extent that wider monitoring of
non-dangerous pretrial defendants is probable in any case, net-widening
concerns diminish. There are some ways to combat net-widening within the
class of pretrial defendants. Perhaps most significantly, granting time-served
credit, whether in full or part, for the monitoring period would both
acknowledge the very real privacy cost to the defendant and likely reduce the
incentive to use monitoring in place of non-incarcerative options. Maintaining
a money bail option for those able and willing to pay for it could help as well—
indeed, this is advisable from both a privacy and political economy perspective.
Finally, the Scottish experience suggests some cause for optimism about the
ability of legislation to control net-widening. Judges in the small trial program
there were instructed to consider monitoring only as an alternative to
detention, and this appears to have been effective.168

165.

166.
167.

168.

See J. Robert Lilly, An Overview on Electronic Monitoring: The United States and Britain 1988,
in THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF OFFENDERS: SYMPOSIUM PAPERS 5, 5 (Ken Russell & J.
Robert Lilly eds., 1989) (noting “the development in the US of an increasingly significant
number of private corporations organized to offer ‘tagging’ services to an expanding
market”); In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons, ACLU 63 (2010),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf (reporting the efforts of private
probation companies to expand the scope of supervision); TARHEEL MONITORING, LLC,
http://www.tarheelmonitoring.com (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (“A secured bond married to
a GPS electronic monitoring anklet is indeed the best possible tool for the production of the
defendant and public safety.”).
Cf. Nellis, supra note 94, at 13 (noting the success of electronic monitoring companies and
how they view the “entire prison market” as potentially open to them).
See, e.g., Ackerman v. State, 179 P.3d 951, 952 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (“Fred’s Bail Bonding
in Anchorage now has some private electronic monitoring for pretrial or bail situations.”);
Global Monitoring, DAVID VALENTINE BAIL BONDS, http://www.davidvalentinebailbonds
.com/global-monitoring (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (offering monitoring services).
See Report on the Use of Bail and Remand, supra note 98, at 9 (describing how Scottish law
allows judges to offer monitoring only if bail has been denied and defendant applies).
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On the whole, then, Orwellian fears about monitoring—however well
justified elsewhere—are not as strong in the context of its use as a substitute for
pretrial detention for failure to post bond. From the perspective of the
defendant who would otherwise sit in jail, the privacy and liberty gains are
immense. Larger segments of society are unlikely to be snagged by the criminal
justice system as a result. And while some released defendants may be
monitored who would otherwise not be if monitoring were to replace flightrisk detention, the liberty and privacy costs must be weighed against the
benefits to those who would otherwise not be released. Similarly, if monitoring
decreases the marginal cost of arrests by reducing jail costs, arrests may
increase—a benefit if more murderers are caught, but, in the eyes of many, a
cost if more low-level drug offenders are arrested.169 The exact balance of this
tradeoff is difficult to predict, and it depends, inter alia, on the form of
monitoring employed—the more invasive it is, the lower the benefit to the
newly freed and the greater the harm to the newly monitored. As discussed
below, the doctrinal bases for courts to limit the extent of flight-risk
monitoring exist, and for all but the most intrusive technologies, the result is
likely to be a net gain of liberty and privacy.
E. Inequality
Finally, there are concerns about continued inequality if monitoring is used
in lieu of commercial bail. These are, in a way, the opposite of the netwidening objection discussed just above: to the extent that unmonitored
release on bail remains an option for those who can afford it, the economic
discrimination of the current system is maintained. So far, in fact, the advent of
GPS tracking, combined with older and more expensive forms of monitoring,
has in some cases worsened this discrimination, as rich-and-high-flight-risk
defendants have avoided detention by a combination of electronic monitoring
and expensive private guards.170 But if it is true, as argued here, that electronic
monitoring is a major improvement over imprisonment, then the gap between
rich and poor will be narrowed significantly by using it in place of
imprisonment for failure to post bond. In the absence of better alternatives,
opposing the expanded use of monitoring on equality grounds would seem

169.
170.

See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 157 (arguing that the criminal justice system facilitates mass
incarceration of racial minorities, often for relatively minor offenses).
Saletan, supra note 111.
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perverse, but equality concerns might justify a call for universal monitoring of
pretrial defendants. Such a proposal pits liberty (for the wealthier) against
economic equality in an unusually stark way, and while the resolution of the
moral question may be in some doubt, the practical question is not: courts as
well as legislatures are unlikely to curtail the rights of moneyed defendants in
the name of equality.171
Considered as a whole, the objections to the replacement of pretrial
detention for flight risk with electronic monitoring pale in comparison to the
arguments in its favor—the tremendous gains in liberty, privacy, fairness, and
equality for those released. Because pretrial detainees are subjected to an
extremely high and extremely burdensome level of government control, a less
repugnant method of control offered by technology is a boon. And because the
size of the group subject to this control is governed almost entirely by factors
unrelated to the financial and political costs of exercising it, lowering those
costs will not cause the government to extend its grasp much further. There is
something unsavory about a government electronically monitoring its citizens,
but in this case, it is more savory than a government imprisoning them for lack
of funds; it is an evil, but a lesser one.
Nonetheless, as explored further below, the political process cannot be
trusted to widely embrace electronic monitoring as a replacement for
detention.172 For nearly a hundred years, the existence of a powerful
commercial bondsmen lobby173—and a lack of interest in the plight of poor

171.

172.
173.

It is possible that if monitoring proves significantly more effective at preventing flight than
money bail, courts may begin to require it in lieu of money bail for non-indigent
defendants. In light of the strength of the bail lobby and wealthy defendants, however, this
is perhaps unlikely.
See infra Part III.
See BEELEY, supra note 8, at 156 (concluding in 1927 that the bondsman “[i]n many cases . . .
works in collusion with lawyers, clerks, policemen, politicians etc.” and that “[t]he
professional bondsman plays too important a role in the local administration of criminal
justice”); WICE, supra note 63, at 16 (describing in 1973 the use of problematic “double
bonding” in “cities where bondsmen appeared to possess relatively strong political clout”);
Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.,
6-7, 21, http://www.pretrial.org/download/infostop/PJI-History%20of%20Bail%20Revised
%20Feb%202011.pdf (last updated Sept. 24, 2010) (describing the history of the U.S. bail
bondsman industry and noting that it likely began as early as 1898, with common use by the
1920s, and describing “Strike Back!,” an “aggressive and concerted effort to eliminate
pretrial services agencies . . . and release on personal recognizance bond to promote the
interests of the commercial surety industry” in the mid-1990s, which was waged with the
help of “money bail bond organizations” and the American Legislative Exchange Council);
infra note 242 (showing recent bondsmen opposition to reform).
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defendants—has hampered reform efforts. The judiciary, then, is the most
promising locus of reform. Part III will show that there is a solid basis for both
a constitutional and statutory right to monitoring for defendants detained for
lack of funds, and Part IV will demonstrate that despite a vigorous, ongoing
debate over the courts’ role in responding to technological change, they should
not hesitate to implement those rights.
iii. the right to be monitored
Over the years, numerous solutions have been proposed to the broken bail
system,174 and some, including the expanded use of personal recognizance
bonds and pretrial services programs, have been implemented on a small
scale—often against the opposition of the commercial bail industry—with
varying degrees of success. Recently, New York’s Chief Judge proposed bail
reform legislation that he hoped will make the bond industry “basically
irrelevant.”175 He may be able to achieve this, but history suggests that, if so, it
will be through his judicial decisions, not his rhetoric. As has long been
recognized, judges can sometimes succeed in protecting the rights of
unpopular groups where legislatures do not,176 and in the bail context, state
and federal constitutions and statutes form a perhaps surprisingly solid
foundation for a right to monitoring. As discussed below, the statutory
arguments are somewhat more straightforward, but, of course, much more
subject to change.

174.

175.

176.

See BEELEY, supra note 8, at 165-71 (proposing “direct measures” and “palliatives”); WICE,
supra note 63, at 49-52 (proposing a model program that would serve as an alternative to the
traditional bail system); Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pt. 2), 113 U.
PA. L. REV. 1125, 1126-37 (1965) (proposing how a hypothetical bail case would proceed
without violating constitutional principles).
Joel Stashenko, Lippman Proposes Bail System Fix, Expansion of Supervised
Release, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp
?id=1202587085501&Lippman_Proposes_Bail_System_Fix_Expansion_of_Supervised_Release.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 8, 135 (1980) (proposing that
courts must do more than “remov[e] barriers to . . . participation in the political process”);
Patrick Luff, Captured Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts 3 (Dec. 31, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195169 (arguing that “courts
generally act in the public interest,” unlike legislatures).
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A. An Eighth Amendment Right to Be Monitored
Although pretrial detention for failure to post bond clearly implicates other
constitutional concerns,177 the Excessive Bail Clause is the provision that speaks
directly to pretrial detention, and the strongest case for a right to monitoring
rests on it. This is true even though it has not generated a great deal of judicial
or academic interest in recent years. In a previous generation, a vigorous debate
focused on whether the Clause created a right to a bail calculation based solely
on flight risk.178 Interest waned, however, after the Supreme Court answered
this question in the negative in United States v. Salerno,179 upholding detention
for dangerousness and indicating that neither the Bail Clause nor Substantive
Due Process meaningfully limits the permissible justifications for pretrial
detention.180
But Salerno did not completely empty the clause of content: regardless of
what ends are permissible, “excessive”-ness clearly implies an inquiry into the
relationship between those ends and the means employed to achieve them. As
one court in the Southern District of New York put it, although the Excessive
Bail Clause contains no “absolute ‘least restrictive conditions’ requirement . . .
it must preclude bail conditions that are more onerous than necessary” and
“result in deprivation of the defendant’s liberty.”181 This must surely be broadly

177.
178.
179.
180.

181.

See infra note 228.
See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 10-14; Tribe, supra note 63, at 404; see also Wiseman, supra
note 21, at 130 n.52 (collecting sources).
481 U.S. 739 (1987); see sources cited supra note 178 (describing the scholarly arguments for
a right to bail that were rejected by Salerno).
In an early article building on the work of Jed Rubenfeld and Laurence Claus, I argued that
the Excessive Bail Clause was intended to limit arbitrary, discriminatory, and coercive bail
demands and therefore requires the use of objective, actuarial measures of risk. See
Wiseman, supra note 21 (proposing an objective standard in order to avoid discrimination in
the setting of bail); cf. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 62 (2003) (proposing objective preventive detention rules).
United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). With the existence of
inexpensive monitoring technologies and a lack of evidence that money bail better ensures
presence at trial, other plaintiffs may be similarly successful. Cf. GOLDKAMP, supra note 21, at
228 (“[I]f the burden fell to the state to show that—in the face of a defendant’s right to
pretrial release—the present operation of the bail decision is relevant to the causes of
assuring appearance and protecting the community from dangerous defendants, in the
strictest empirical sense it would fail. The state could not demonstrate that the bail decision
and the use of detention . . . serve to keep failure-to-appear rates and rates of pretrial crime
at a noticeably lower rate than if all defendants were released before trial.”).
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correct, but it also reflects the lack of a clear standard. Distinct from identifying
the types of threats restrictions on pretrial liberty may be used to counter or the
methods used to quantify that threat, however, the question of how close a fit
the Clause requires between that threat and the response remains uncertain. In
other words, the Court has told us what restrictions on pretrial liberty must be
measured against, but not how they are to be measured—how closely the means
must fit the ends.
How is excessiveness to be measured? Crucially, for a right to monitoring,
is it to be calculated solely using the internal, actuarial logic of the money bail
system, or should it be measured on the basis of all viable alternatives? The
courts have not yet provided a clear answer to these questions.
A richer jurisprudence of excessiveness is needed, and towards that goal the
balance of this Section will argue the text, history, and case law of the Excessive
Bail Clause suggest that at least an intermediate level of scrutiny should be
applied to the fit between the legislature’s goals for its system of pretrial release
and the means employed to achieve them. Applying this standard, which
requires that the means chosen not be “substantially broader than necessary to
achieve [the government’s] interest,”182 a bond requirement resulting in
detention is clearly excessive if monitoring could serve the state’s goals equally
well (and equally efficiently).
The key to this constitutional argument, as well as the statutory arguments
below, is establishing monitoring’s superior effectiveness. In light of the strong
liberty, privacy, and equality infringements of jailing pretrial defendants, the
standard of proof should be somewhat low, perhaps requiring proof that it is
“more likely than not” that jail is a substantially overbroad means of preventing
flight. Here, the relevant reference point is the appearance rate of defendants
released on financial conditions against that for otherwise similarly situated
monitored defendants who would have been detained for lack of bail—if the
latter rate (and the cost of monitoring relative to imprisoning183) is as low or
lower, a concern over flight risk cannot justify imprisonment. The effectiveness
of pretrial detention at producing the defendant at trial cannot be the point of
comparison, because bail, not detention, is the explicitly preferred option, and

182.
183.

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 783 (1989).
There is a strong argument, of course, that detention should not be justified on the basis of
cost savings alone. But, as noted above, given the Court’s recent history of extreme
reluctance to force governments to spend money on the machinery of criminal justice even
to prevent the most serious deprivations, monitoring will likely have to be demonstrably
cost-neutral, or very close to it, for a challenge to succeed.
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its continued use establishes beyond doubt that Congress does not require
100% success. Nonetheless, producing such a record is a serious hurdle, and
without it, defenders of the bail system would be able to argue that the same
lack of resources that prevents the poor from obtaining release makes them less
likely to fear the repercussions of failing to appear for trial. The best hope for
the creation of such a record may lie in one of the four states that have banned
commercial bail184—or, perhaps, from entrepreneurial bondsmen. The limited
success of systems in Europe, as discussed in Part II, will also provide an
important foundation.
1. Current Eighth Amendment Doctrine
There is surprisingly little precedent interpreting the Excessive Bail Clause,
and the methodology for determining excessiveness remains somewhat
uncertain. Nonetheless, a heightened scrutiny approach is consistent with the
case law.
The leading case remains United States v. Salerno, in which the Court
considered a challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The petitioner argued
that the Act, which allows defendants to be detained out of concern that they
would commit a crime if released pending trial—a concern largely unrelated to
flight—was unconstitutional. The Court rejected, 6-3, this argument in an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. After reviewing the roots of the
Excessive Bail Clause in the English Bill of Rights and the Court’s scanty and
somewhat contradictory precedents,185 the Court declined even to decide
whether the Clause placed any limits at all on Congress, as opposed to the
judiciary:
[W]e need not decide today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at
all to Congress’ power to define the classes of criminal arrestees who
shall be admitted to bail. For even if we were to conclude that the

184.
185.

See Cohen & Reaves, supra note 2, at 4.
Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951), which found that “[u]nless this right to bail
before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of
struggle, would lose its meaning,” with Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952)
(footnotes omitted), which observed that “[i]n England that clause has never been thought
to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in
those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of
Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different concept.” See also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-53 (1987) (reviewing these cases).
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Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive limitations on the
National Legislature’s powers in this area, we would still hold that the
Bail Reform Act is valid. . . . The only arguable substantive limitation of
the Bail Clause is that the Government’s proposed conditions of release
or detention not be “excessive” in light of the perceived evil.186
The Excessive Bail Clause, so interpreted, provides a rather narrow window
through which to challenge conditions of pretrial release—or a lack thereof.187
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the Clause has been of so little importance
that the question of its incorporation against the states appears to have been
decided in a footnote—in a case about an unrelated constitutional provision.188
Nonetheless, assuming that the “only arguable substantive limitation” imposed
by the Excessive Bail Clause—the prohibition on excessive means of achieving
desired bail purposes—does in fact exist, the continued detention of
impecunious defendants despite the existence of cost-effective alternatives to
ensuring their presence at trial conflicts with even this rather stunted
conception of pretrial liberty. And this limit should exist: applying the Clause
only to the judiciary would be highly anomalous.189 The Framers, along with
later constitutional theorists,190 understood that legislative majorities can be as
much of a threat to individual rights as the executive, and certainly the judicial,
branch.191 And indeed, the lower courts have consistently assumed or held that

186.
187.

188.
189.

190.

191.

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754.
See id. at 761 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that under the Court’s interpretation of the
Excessive Bail Clause, “every federal magistrate and district judge could simply refuse,
despite the absence of any evidence of risk of flight or danger to the community, to set
bail”); Wiseman, supra note 21, at 146.
Samuel Wiseman, McDonald’s Other Right, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 23 (2011).
See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 63, at 399-400 (arguing pre-Salerno that an interpretation of the
Clause that bound only the courts would be “totally inconsistent with a Bill of Rights
concerned almost exclusively with curtailing the powers of Congress”).
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 176, at 78 (noting that the American democratic system “does not
ensure . . . the effective protection of minorities”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 94 (1988)
(concluding that Fourth Amendment rights are likely to be “undervalued in the political
process” and that “judicial intervention is justified” because searches and seizures primarily
affect “politically less powerful groups”).
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455-56 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James
Madison) (observing that “improper laws could be enacted by the State Legislatures, for
fulfilling the more extended objects of those Governments”).
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the Salerno limit applies.192 The question, then, is what the contours of that
limit are. Although, as discussed below, the Court has left them rather vague,
nothing in the case law precludes the requirement of a close fit between means
and ends.
In Stack v. Boyle, the Court considered an Eighth Amendment challenge
brought by twelve petitioners charged with conspiring to violate the Smith Act,
which criminalized, inter alia, advocating the violent overthrow of the United
States government or organizing or joining a group that did so.193 Bail had
been set for each petitioner at an amount greater than was typical for crimes
with similar maximum punishment.
The Court began its analysis by noting that “[b]ail set at a figure higher
than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [its] purpose is excessive,” and
that “the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon
standards relevant to the purpose.”194 It then looked to the “traditional
standards as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,” which
included the offense charged, the weight of the evidence, and the defendant’s
financial ability and character.195 The government had put forth no evidence,
but asked the Court to affirm on the theory that “each petitioner is a pawn in a
conspiracy and will, in obedience to a superior, flee the jurisdiction.”196 The
Court rejected this argument, holding that “[t]o infer from the fact of
indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary
act,” and that in the absence of evidence the bail set violated “statutory and
constitutional standards.”197

192.

193.

194.
195.
196.
197.

See, e.g., Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Salerno confirms
that the Excessive Bail Clause prevents the imposition of bail conditions that are excessive in
light of the valid interests the state seeks to protect by offering bail.”); Payton v. Cnty. of
Carroll, 473 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing a Salerno limit on the legislature);
Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2003) (same).
342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951); see also Alien Registration Act (Smith Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012)
(making it a criminal offense to advocate the violent overthrow of the U.S. government);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 496, 516 (1951) (holding the Smith Act constitutional
and affirming a conviction under the Act for organizing and advocating “the overthrow or
destruction of any government . . . by force or violence” or affiliating with a group that
would do so).
Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 5 n.3.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
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Stack, then, is more concerned with how flight risk must be proven than
with matching flight risk to the government’s response, but there are some
indications that the Court was engaging in something more than a rational
basis review. “Reasonably” and “arbitrary” can both suggest a range of levels of
scrutiny, and arguably foreclose strict scrutiny.198 At the same time, the Court’s
reasoning seems inconsistent with a rational basis approach. In a time in which
the American Communist Party was viewed as “a highly disciplined
organization, adept at infiltration into strategic positions,” dedicated to the
“overthrow of the Government by force and violence” and possessing the
“slavish[]” obedience of its members,199 it hardly seems irrational for the Court
to have thought that those who were charged with Smith Act violations
categorically posed a greater risk of flight.200
In Salerno, the excessiveness analysis was more cursory. The Court stated
that “to determine whether the Government’s response is excessive, we must
compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect
. . . . [B]ail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no
more,”201 and added little more before concluding that detention was a
permissible means of preventing serious pretrial crime.
The Salerno Court did, however, acknowledge that “the individual’s strong
interest in liberty” is of a “fundamental nature,”202 and it would be highly
anomalous not to subject a deprivation of such a right to meaningful review
under a constitutional provision designed to protect it. And importantly, the
Court has not looked to its rather permissive Cruel and Unusual Punishment
proportionality jurisprudence to determine excessiveness under the Bail Clause

198.

199.
200.

201.
202.

Moreover, judicial measurements of individual flight risk, like those of the gravity of
individual offenses, are arguably imprecise. This imprecision was a factor supporting a weak
proportionality requirement under the Excessive Fines Clause. See United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) (“[A]ny judicial determination regarding the gravity of
a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise . . . . [W]e therefore adopt the
standard of gross disproportionality articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause precedents.”).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 498 (1951).
Cf. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding that under equal
protection rational basis review in areas of social and economic policy, “a legislative choice is
not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data”).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987).
Id. at 750.
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as it has under the Excessive Fines Clause.203 This is wholly appropriate,
because bail is not meant as punishment—which legislatures have a great
amount of discretion to tailor204—but rather process. And the courts and other
parts of the Constitution typically give far less leeway to legislatures in limiting
criminal procedural rights.
Thus, although there is nothing definitive either way, requiring, at the
minimum, a substantial fit between the ends served by a system of pretrial
release and the means employed is consistent with current doctrine.205 Nor is
there anything to foreclose looking beyond the internal logic of the money bail
system; due to the historical dearth of highly effective, efficient alternatives, the
issue has not yet arisen.
2. Text, History, and Purpose
Requiring at least a substantial relationship between pretrial burdens and
their justification also finds support in the text of the Eighth Amendment,
which mandates that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required . . . .” From the
beginning, this deceptively simple phrase has seemed more noble sentiment
than source of concrete rights. As the speaker of the only recorded comment on
the Bail Clause during the congressional debate over the adoption of the Bill of
Rights put it: “The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do

203.

204.

205.

Compare Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 (“[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines
Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”), with Salerno,
481 U.S. at 754 (discussing excessive bail without reference to cruel and unusual
punishment), and Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (same).
See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 330-31 (concluding that deference to legislative judgments with
respect to punishment and the imprecision of judicial determinations of the gravity of
individual offenses support a gross disproportionality standard).
Numerous excessiveness challenges have been made to the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act, in which Congress mandated bail limitations for sex offenders charged with
certain crimes or a failure to register. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)-(2) (2012). One court noted that
it must compare “proposed conditions with the interests the government seeks to protect,
including assuring the defendant’s appearance at trial.” United States v. Crowell, No. 06M-1095, 2006 WL 3541736, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006). In hinting at the needed
closeness, the court suggested that the “least restrictive” conditions might be necessary. Id.
at *7. But see, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(citing Stack and Salerno and noting that “until Crowell, there appears to be no case law
holding that the ‘least restrictive’ requirement of the Bail Reform Act is constitutionally
mandated”).

1389

the yale law journal

123:1344

2014

not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to
be the judges?”206
Nonetheless, we can put some meat on the bare bones of the Clause.
Looking to the original public meaning207 of constitutional provisions, as the
Court has done with respect to the Excessive Fines Clause,208 “excess” meant,
according to Samuel Johnson’s dictionary, “[m]ore than enough; superfluity,”
and excessive “[b]eyond the common proportion of quantity or bulk.”209 And
when the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied the Eighth Amendment to
the states, was adopted, “excessive” meant “[b]eyond the established laws of
morality and religion, or beyond the bounds of justice, fitness, propriety,
expedience, or utility,” with the Excessive Bail Clause specifically cited as an
example of this usage.210 Thus, in contrast to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness,211 excessiveness clearly embodies a requirement of meaningful
proportionality.212 And unless it is to be a constitutional nullity, it must require
more than a merely rational relationship between means and ends—that much,
of course, is required by the Due Process Clause. Moreover, constitutional
proportionality must necessarily take into account changing real-world

206.
207.

208.

209.
210.
211.

212.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789) (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of
Rep. Samuel Livermore).
See Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2012)
(“Today, most academic originalists and even some living constitutionalists say that
constitutional interpretation should proceed, first and foremost, from the original meaning
of the text at issue.” (footnote omitted)).
See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335 (citing 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), which defined “excessive” as “beyond the common measure or
proportion,” and SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 680 (4th ed.
1773), which defined it as “[b]eyond the common proportion”).
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768).
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 418 (1862).
Cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989) (discussing various
cases in which the Supreme Court has rejected post hoc “less-restrictive-alternative” tests for
assessing the reasonableness of police searches and seizures).
In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983), the Supreme Court reasoned that this
proportionality principle was embedded in the 1689 English Bill of Rights’s prohibition on
“excessive Baile” and “cruell and unusuall Punishments.” See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting the Solem Court’s equation of “cruell
and unusuall Punishments” with “disproportionate” or “excessive” punishments); see also
Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119,
122-23 (2004) (“Where a court exercises its bail or fine jurisdiction to set bail or to impose a
fine that cannot be paid, its action is objectively excessive and that excessiveness invites an
inference of immoral discrimination.”).
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conditions to avoid obsolescence. We would not, for example, judge the
excessiveness of a fine (or bail setting) using eighteenth-century standards;
inflation would render that approach absurd. Similarly, whether an amount is
“excessive” under the Bail Clause should not be judged in terms of the money
bail system of the past, but in light of modern alternatives. And as argued
below, this rich conception of excessiveness is essential to fulfilling the purpose
of the Clause. As Jamal Greene has noted, the Framers’ intent remains relevant
to courts dealing with constitutional questions,213 and purpose more broadly is
important to theorists of many stripes.214 The Founders transferred the phrase
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,” with slight modification, from state
charters, which had borrowed the phrase from the English Bill of Rights and
other English laws.215 The English Bill of Rights was a direct response to the
Crown’s practice of imprisoning political dissidents indefinitely without cause
and denying them bail. While the Petition of Right in 1627 and the later
Habeas Corpus Act provided some protections, judges were still able to
effectively deny bail by setting it at a high monetary amount—a practice that
still occurs in American courts today, although not for such egregiously
political reasons as those of the 1600s.216 The Excessive Bail Clause of the
English Bill of Rights therefore directly addressed the problem, outlined in a
House of Commons report, of the “‘illegal and a high breach of the liberty of
the subject’ [in] the refusing of ‘sufficient’ bail.”217
The history of the Excessive Bail Clause in England and its transfer to the
United States suggests a direct response to the sovereign’s use of political

213.

214.
215.

216.

217.

See Greene, supra note 207, at 1686 (“[C]onstitutional practitioners continue to reason as
though the intentions and expectations of prominent members of the Founding generation
are highly relevant to the Constitution’s application to modern cases and controversies.”).
See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 21, at 149 n.166 (listing theorists who “look to the purposes
for the adoption of constitutional text at the time of its adoption”).
Wiseman, supra note 21, at 127-30; see also Duker, supra note 20, at 45-46 (discussing the
Statute of Westminster’s (1275) provision of certain protections against the extortionate
practices of local sheriffs).
Claus, supra note 212, at 123 (noting that in England “the Court of King’s Bench repeatedly
abused its discretion by setting bail and imposing fines of more than the offender could pay”
and thus “effectively imposed indefinite prison sentences upon political opponents of the
Stuart monarchs,” and concluding that “[t]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive
bail and excessive fines thus contemplated an objective referent for what counted as
excessive”).
LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 90 (1981) (quoting 9 H.C.
JOUR. 692 (1680)); see also Foote, supra note 63, at 965-79 (describing the purpose of British
bail protections and their adoption in the United States).
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power—and his influence on judges—to wrongly and indefinitely imprison
individuals to punish or coerce them.218 The right to monitoring is consistent
with this core purpose of the Excessive Bail Clause: keeping people locked up
increases the likelihood of a guilty plea,219 weakening the core protection
against arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution—the jury trial. Indeed, as
Professor Sanford Levinson has observed, the federal-state relationship is not
the sole guarantee against a tyrannical national government; the Bill of Rights
also intends to enlist citizens in this mission by protecting “popular liberty
against state depredation.”220 Incarceration is the most intrusive and thorough
means of depriving individuals of liberty, yet we currently jail thousands of
citizens not yet proven guilty of any crime. We prevent these individuals from
forming a good defense,221 thus raising their chances of being convicted and
incarcerated, and this liberty deprivation extends to families and society as a
whole. The right to remain free before trial—albeit within a somewhat
intrusive monitoring regime—seems to rest comfortably alongside, or even
above, other rights often cited as necessary to free citizenship. This, too,
strongly suggests that the required fit between the legislature’s ends and the
chosen means must not be overly loose: a rational basis analysis, under which
almost anything is permissible, would do little or nothing to prevent these
abuses.
And while an amendment that specifically contemplates the existence of
bail might at first glance seem an unlikely source of a right to an alternative,
this is not an especially serious objection. In the same way that even a low bail
setting is excessive if the traditional alternative of release on personal
recognizance would equally satisfy the purposes of the bail setting, any bail
requirement aimed at reducing flight risk and resulting in detention is
excessive if monitoring would achieve that goal as efficiently and effectively.
More fundamentally, it is clear that the setting of non-excessive bail is not an
end in itself, but rather a means toward the goal of greater pretrial liberty.222 Its

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Claus, supra note 212, at 123.
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 652 (1989).
See supra note 45.
Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 774 (1994)
(arguing that the Framers viewed search warrants “as an enemy, not a friend,” and relied on
juries’ ideas of reasonability to protect liberty (quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969))).
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purpose was not to enshrine the money bail system, but to ensure pretrial
liberty (using the best option available at the time) and to prevent tyrannical
use of pretrial detention. As technology makes achieving society’s goals with
respect to pretrial defendants easier, so should our measure of what is
excessive.223 And indeed, the Excessive Bail Clause has not been thought to
apply only to financial conditions—it has been used to successfully challenge
non-monetary conditions.224
3. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
At least an intermediate level of scrutiny is consistent with precedent and
warranted by the text and purpose of the Eighth Amendment. Applying this
standard, the question is whether the use of money bail to ensure the
defendant’s presence at trial is excessive under Salerno—that is, substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the governmental interests at stake—in the
face of a record, like that discussed above, proving the existence of an equally
effective and inexpensive monitoring alternative. Given the large percentage of
defendants detained for failure to post relatively modest bonds in many
jurisdictions,225 the answer appears to be very likely yes—rendering those
jurisdictions susceptible to Eighth Amendment (and/or state constitutional)
challenges to bail settings from detained, non-dangerous defendants not
posing an extreme flight risk.226 Courts would, in all likelihood, give these
jurisdictions reasonable time to deploy a monitoring regime, but eventually
they would be forced to release these defendants, monitored or not.227

223.

224.

225.
226.
227.

Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 487-88 (2011) (arguing that judges “adopt lower Fourth Amendment protections”
when changing technologies or practices weaken police enforcement powers and more
stringent protections when technology “significantly enhances government power,” and
defending this approach).
Cf. United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (assuming that
“the Excessive Bail Clause applies to conditions of release,” noting that “[a]lthough the
explicit text of the Eighth Amendment appears to address the amount of bail fixed, no court
has so limited the reach of this provision,” and observing that “Salerno broadly states that
the ‘substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s proposed conditions of
release or detention not be “excessive” in light of the perceived evil’” (citing United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987))).
See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
Depending on the magnitude of economies of scale in the deployment of monitoring
systems, larger jurisdictions might be required to act more swiftly.
Cf. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1921 (2011) (upholding a release order for Eighth
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At this point, however, an acknowledgement of the limits of the proposal’s
ability to eliminate wealth inequality in pretrial outcomes or eliminate netwidening concerns is appropriate. To be clear, under the analysis set out above
a jurisdiction could very reasonably conclude, even once the efficiency of
monitoring is clearly established, that it prefers to maintain a money bail
option because it is less intrusive for those who can afford it. And it is very
likely true that for some of those who can afford it, even a large amount of
money would not seem excessive if the alternative is some form of electronic
monitoring. Nothing in the foregoing argument would prevent them from
doing so. A right to the alternative would simply be an option to select
monitoring in lieu of pretrial release. But it would forbid a jurisdiction from
jailing a defendant because he could not pay this “luxury tax.” This outcome
might be unsatisfying to those concerned with economic discrimination, as it
would perpetuate, to a lesser degree, the disparity of pretrial treatment based
on financial resources. And beyond principle, ensuring that white-collar
defendants were subject to the same conditions as the less affluent would help
limit the invasiveness of those conditions. But although these concerns bear
careful consideration, similar arguments have received short shrift under the
Equal Protection Clause, and it is difficult to find a toehold for them under the
Eighth Amendment.228

228.

Amendment violations in California prisons but stating that the lower court must “accord
the State considerable latitude” and noting that a deadline extension may be appropriate).
Several additional constitutional arguments are worthy of mention but likely have a lower
chance of success than an Eighth Amendment claim. Although the blatant and pervasive
financial inequity of the current system implicates the principles underlying the Equal
Protection Clause, as a doctrinal matter a Fourteenth Amendment argument would face a
steep uphill climb. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1973) (finding a
rational basis for slight differences in “good-time credit” earned for those who could and
could not afford or qualify for bail); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 369 (1971) (holding that
Illinois’s bail system did not violate equal protection guarantees). The extremely permissive
rational basis standard applicable to wealth discrimination would likely doom an equal
protection challenge, as the bail system, for all its faults, is not wholly irrational, and
maintaining it could likely be justified on the basis of avoiding short term administrative
costs. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2081-84 (2012) (holding that
administrative convenience justifies unequal treatment of sewer customers).
Recently, Professor Baradaran has argued forcefully that the presumption of innocence
embodied in the Due Process Clause requires better and more consistent procedures if
courts are to deprive defendants of pretrial liberty, Baradaran, supra note 20, at 767-68, but
such a challenge faces perhaps an even steeper hurdle in the Court’s reluctance to rely on a
general constitutional provision when a more specific one exists. The same hurdle exists in
the bail context for the persuasive argument advanced by Professors Logan, Janus, and
Slobogin that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a least-restrictive-means requirement for
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However, for those concerned that even monitoring is not a carefully
delineated approach to achieving pretrial presence and that defendants who
would have simply been released may now be swept into the monitoring net,
Salerno and Stack provide the doctrinal foundation for limiting the extent of
monitoring, at least to a degree—the amount and nature of monitoring would
have to be justified with reference to their effect on flight risk. In light of the
intrusive nature of many current conditions of pretrial release, this might not
be a particularly strong protection, but it would likely prevent extreme forms of
monitoring, such as twenty-four-hour surveillance, that the government might
seek in order to gather evidence or prevent crime.
B. Statutory Approaches
For federal detainees and detainees in states with similar bail statutes,229
another path to monitoring in lieu of detention for flight risk lies in the Bail
Reform Act’s requirement that a judge impose “the least restrictive further
condition, or combination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety
of any other person and the community.”230 Electronic monitoring is clearly
less restrictive than a monetary requirement resulting in detention; therefore,
once a sufficient record of a technological alternative’s efficiency and

229.

230.

preventive detention. See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the
Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 360-61 (2003)
(proposing a strict scrutiny standard, including a compelling interest requirement and “least
restrictive means available to achieve that end”); Slobogin, supra note 180, at 13, 62
(proposing that for preventive detention, “the duration of the commitment must be
reasonably related to the prevention of the harm predicted” and that rules should require
“treatment and detention in the least restrictive manner feasible” (emphasis omitted)).
See, e.g., Karpouzis v. Gov’t of the V.I., 961 F. Supp. 841 (D.V.I. 1997) (requiring least
restrictive conditions and criticizing the lower court’s rejection of inexpensive electronic
monitoring). The following examples show state statutes, rules, and cases that require the
use of the least restrictive means: ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(b) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
54-63b(b), -64a (2013); D.C. CODE § 23-1321(c)(1)(B) (2012); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1026 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58A(2)(B) (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-20-10 (LexisNexis 2003) (bail on appeal); N.C. 26th JUDICIAL DIST. BAIL POLICY
(2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. Rule 5-401 (LexisNexis 2013); BAIL GUIDELINES, R.I. CT. R. ANN.
(2013); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2 (2013); Thomas v. State, 542 S.W.2d 284 (Ark.
1976); Brill v. Gurich, 965 P.2d 404 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012). Although the Bail Reform Act does not specifically list
electronic monitoring as a possible condition, it may be ordered under the catchall
provision.
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effectiveness exists, it should be required by the Bail Reform Act and similar
statutes. At least one court has taken a preliminary step in this direction. In
Karpouzis v. Government of the Virgin Islands,231 the Appellate Division of the
District Court of the Virgin Islands applied the least restrictive means
requirement of a territory law to reverse a $2 million bail requirement when the
“trial court gave no explanation why house arrest with electronic monitoring, a
responsible third-party custodian, and a very significantly reduced monetary
bail in the range proffered by appellant would not adequately ensure
appellant’s presence at trial.”232
Karpouzis was limited, of course, to the individual circumstances of the
case. For meaningful reform, a broader approach is necessary. If monitoring’s
superiority in reducing flight can be established, then it should always be
required under these statutes as an alternative to an unmeetable bail setting.
Further, since judges (and defendants themselves, who very often lack counsel
at the bail stage233) often cannot know in advance exactly what a defendant can
afford,234 and since a meetable bond will often be more restrictive than
electronic monitoring, courts should be required to offer monitoring as an
alternative when setting bail. In this way, a portion of the least restrictive
means analysis is given over to the party with the greatest ability—and
incentive—to get it right.
The Bail Reform Act applies only in federal court, leaving only
constitutional arguments for detainees in states without analogous statutory
language. Indeed, even in jurisdictions with similar legislation, judges may be
more comfortable imposing the adoption or expansion of monitoring on
constitutional grounds. Constitutional grounds, moreover, have the added
advantage of being further removed from the reach of legislatures—and special
interests.235

231.
232.
233.
234.

235.

961 F. Supp. 841 (D.V.I. 1997).
Id. at 851-52.
See Colbert, supra note 34, at 345.
Karpouzis involved the “‘the sub rosa use of money bond’ to detain the appellant,” 961 F.
Supp. at 851, but many flight risk detentions do not. Indeed, although the Bail Reform Act
forbids “financial condition[s] that result[] in the pretrial detention of the person,” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2), this has been interpreted to allow detention when the defendant cannot
afford a bond sufficient to ensure his presence; in these cases, as the First Circuit explained,
the defendant is detained “not because he cannot raise the money, but because without the
money, the risk of flight is too great,” United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 389 (1st Cir.
1985).
For the many defendants jailed under state criminal law, state constitutions offer some
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iv. the case for judicial intervention
Having made the normative, constitutional, and statutory case for a right to
monitoring, it is necessary to consider one last set of objections. In light of an
ongoing, important debate over whether courts or legislatures are the proper
bodies to define the limits on governments’ use of technology,236 it is worth
explaining why judicial intervention is necessary. Broadly speaking, on one
side, the unpopularity of criminal defendants and the existence of a potent law
enforcement lobby may lead legislatures to systematically undervalue
defendants’ rights, thus necessitating increased judicial scrutiny of
encroachments on liberty and privacy.237 On the other hand, because society as
a whole benefits from, and is burdened by, increased police power,
democratically elected legislatures may accurately reflect the preferred
balance.238

236.

237.

238.

support for a right to electronic monitoring. Indeed, most state constitutions include
language similar to the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause, and these, as in the
federal context, could be interpreted to include a right to monitoring. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; IND. CONST. art. I, § 17;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20.
See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2021 (2008) (arguing that “legislative, administrative, and technological solutions may be far
more important means of guaranteeing constitutional freedoms” than the Fourth
Amendment); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 867-76 (2004) (arguing that
legislatures may be better situated to address technology-driven privacy concerns).
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079,
1081, 1090-92 (1993) (arguing that “[l]egislatures undervalue the rights of the accused at
both the investigatory and adjudicatory stages of the criminal process” and describing the
strength of the law enforcement lobby); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 190, at 94-96
(identifying “the young, the black, and the poor,” as being “undervalued in the political
process” under certain theories); cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARV. L. REV. 713, 728-31, 733-35 (1985) (describing “diffuse and anonymous” minorities—
those that do not comprise one, discrete group with a clear, shared interest and are not easily
identified as a group, such as by their appearance—that often lack a seat at the bargaining
table and need protection by courts if their voice is to be heard).
See Kerr, supra note 236, at 885-87 (arguing that “majoritarian preferences” can be
“protective of privacy” and noting that “[n]ew technologies are often used
disproportionately by politically powerful groups”); Stuntz, supra note 15, 1281-87
(describing privacy protections for privileged classes).
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But regardless of the resolution of the debate over institutions best suited
to regulate the government’s use of technology that affects society as a whole, it
is clear as a matter of theory and history that legislatures cannot be relied upon
to appropriately weigh the interests of the unpopular and politically weak,
particularly when those interests conflict with those of a concentrated lobby.239
If it is true that GPS, or future forms of monitoring technology, will soon, if it
does not already, offer a fairer, more effective, and more efficient alternative to
money bail for producing defendants for trial, it would be natural to assume
that, over time, the political process—indeed, mere prudence—might lead to its
widespread adoption. And in some jurisdictions it probably will be adopted.
But the adoption of beneficial technology depends on the priorities of those in
charge—football teams get iPads before philosophy departments. And modern
political theory, amply illustrated by a long history of stunted bail reforms,
suggests that in many jurisdictions, pretrial monitoring will not be adopted
without court involvement. Because of this, the courts, despite some
limitations, should be a driver of reform.
A. Public and Private Interests in Pretrial Release
Commercial bail bonding is among the oldest forms of privatization in
criminal justice. Because it has always relied on the government to create
demand for its services by imposing financial conditions for pretrial release,240
the bond industry has long invested in government relations. Factors crucial to
the industry’s profitability—the number and amount of bonds imposed—are
determined by government policy. And it is a multi-billion dollar industry.241
This creates a classic public choice problem: the benefits of the bail system are
concentrated in the industry, while the harms are borne by a politically weak
group, criminal defendants. Indeed, bondsmen have opposed many efforts to
change the traditional money bail system—including efforts to implement

239.
240.
241.

See supra note 237 (describing the literature on the underrepresentation of minority groups
in the political process).
See supra notes 26-27, 173 (noting the “long tradition” of money bail in the United States).
Christian Parenti, “I Hunt Men”: Meet the Self-Ordained Officers of the Bail Bond Industry, 61
PROGRESSIVE 21, 23 (1997) (“Nationally, bail is a $4-billion-a-year industry, netting $400
million a year in profits.”); see also For Better or for Profit: How the Bail Bonding Industry
Stands in the Way of Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice, JUST. POL’Y INST. 26 (Sept.
2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/_for_better_or_for
_profit_.pdf (conservatively estimating that the bail bonding industry does “$2 billion in
business annually”).
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pretrial monitoring.242 They view pretrial release programs as direct threats to
their business,243 and despite using monitoring technologies themselves to
track defendants,244 they have argued that the technologies are ineffective and
costly to defendants. In response to concerns about the affordability of bonds,
one consultant writing for a bondsman blog suggests that family members or
friends do not post bonds for an accused and leave him in jail because “the
accused is unable to abide by any semblance of rules and regulations.”245 “More
than anything,” he argues, “this is an indictment of our society’s deteriorating
parental skills which seems to have trouble teaching responsibility,
accountability, and discipline. Instead, a family would rather have their
‘deadbeat’ left in jail where they might learn a lesson or two as opposed to
being released on bail.”246
The greatest harm from the system, moreover, is suffered by the least
influential of criminal defendants, those too poor to make bail, while the
relatively few defendants of significant means suffer little inconvenience.
Compounding the problem, the costs of detaining defendants who cannot post
bond are widely dispersed to taxpayers, while bondsmen and their political
allies can claim that the private surety system is otherwise run without cost to

242.

243.

244.
245.
246.

See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court Near You—Convicting the Unrepresented
at the Bail Stage, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 653, 707 n.318 (2006) (noting that in 1999 the
powerful bail bond industry defeated legislation that would have provided counsel at the
bail stage); Todd C. Barsumian, Note, Bail Bondsmen and Bounty Hunters: Re-Examining the
Right to Recapture, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 877, 882 n.28 (1999) (describing bondsmen in some
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LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY xii (1995))); Laura Sullivan, Bondsman Lobby Targets
Pretrial Release Programs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.npr.org
/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725849 (reporting that bondsmen spent $23,000 to
oppose a county pretrial services program in Florida, with fifteen bondsmen each paying
more than $5,000 to the then-county commissioner five days before the vote); Matt Tomsic,
Bail Bond Companies Claim Conflict with Pretrial Release, STAR NEWS, July 24,
2010, http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20100724/ARTICLES/100729788 (discussing
the political feud between bail bondsmen and advocates for pretrial release and monitoring,
and describing how “bail bond companies lobby state legislatures to limit pretrial release
programs”).
See Tim Bryce, Eric Holder vs. the Bail Bond Industry, BAILSOURCE: NATIONWIDE BAIL BOND
SERVICE, http://www.thebailsource.com/blog/eric-holder-vs-the-bail-bond-industry (last
visited Sept. 2, 2013) (“If implemented in full, the pretrial programs [proposed by Attorney
General Eric Holder] will inevitably eliminate the need for bail bondsmen completely.”).
See supra notes 165, 167.
Bryce, supra note 243.
Id.
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the public fisc. And the employees of the jails housing pretrial detainees have
their own lobbies to protect their continued employment.
All of this goes a long way towards explaining why money bail, a practice
developed at a time when there were no professional police and few jails,247 the
earliest possible trial might be months away,248 and the odds of an absconding
defendant being recaptured were long, has survived in modern times despite
vigorous reform efforts. Despite compelling arguments for the expanded use of
personal recognizance and pretrial services programs, in many jurisdictions,
detention for failure to post bond remains widespread. And indeed, despite the
enormous budget pressures facing state and local governments in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn,249 moves to
release a greater number of pretrial defendants have been only sporadic. This
pattern is visible in the history of monitoring technology as well. Although
providers of monitoring technology and services have their own lobbies to
pursue their interests, the result has largely been the monitoring of those who
would previously have been released anyway. In at least one documented case,
the bond industry has successfully lobbied to kill a large-scale monitoring
program.250 Thus, while monitoring technology will probably replace
detention in some jurisdictions in the coming years, likely those with weak or
absent bail lobbies or especially pressing budget problems, there is reason to
believe that in many places the result of the political process will be the
continued existence of money bail—and detention for flight risk.
B. An Imperfect Judicial Solution
Under these circumstances, it is clear that regardless of the resolution of the
larger debate over the relative merits of courts and legislatures in responding to

247.
248.
249.

250.

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Cf. BEELEY, supra note 8, at 124-27 (describing defendants jailed pretrial in the 1920s because
they could not afford the security and who waited for up to 223 days).
Cf. Criminal Justice Section, State Policy Implementation Project, A.B.A. 5, http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/spip_handouts.authche
ckdam.pdf (noting that “[r]eleasing low risk defendants leads to significant savings to local
and state budgets” and that “[l]ast year alone, taxpayers spent $9 billion on pretrial
detainees”).
See Dan Markel & Eric J. Miller, Fire the Bail Bondsmen, SLATE: THE HIVE (June 19,
2012, 7:03 PM), http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/fire-the-bail
-bondsmen (noting that “after heavy lobbying by the influential bail bonding industry, the
legislature killed” a county’s “cheap and safe” electronic monitoring system).
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new technologies, the best hope for an actual monitoring right for flight-risk
detainees lies in judicial intervention. In light of the near certainty of legislative
inaction, the limitations of judicial responses to new technology lose their usual
force; half a loaf is better than no loaf at all. The judiciary, particularly the
elected judiciary, is of course not immune from political considerations, but its
relative independence makes it a far more promising locus of reform. And
although generalist judges typically have no particular scientific expertise,
courts have long experience evaluating the efficacy and affordability of new
technology. The clearest example of this may be in the torts context, which
relies heavily upon proof of available technologies in ascertaining standards of
care to which various actors are held.251 In the famous T.J. Hooper case, Judge
Learned Hand declared that tugboat operators who could have but failed to use
new weather information technologies negligently damaged barges and
cargo.252 Despite the fact that the radio receiving technologies that would have
warned of storms had not yet been “generally adopted” in the business—
indeed, there was “no custom at all” to use the sets, at least according to
Hand253—the court observed that in some cases, “a whole calling may have
unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices,” thus inducing
court action.254 Indeed, subsequent cases have confirmed that where affordable,
state-of-the-art technology would make products safe but has not been widely
adopted, products manufacturers can be liable for failure to install these
products.255 And, of course, federal courts are experienced in assessing the
effectiveness of monitoring provided by Federal Pretrial Services and private
operators in the context of individual bail determinations.256
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I am indebted to Professor Eric Kades for suggesting this line of argument.
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932).
Richard Epstein suggests that radios were in fact required on tugs as a matter of custom and
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Nonetheless, courts are likely to be much more hesitant to base significant
new constitutional or statutory law, as opposed to new tort liability (or
individual release determinations within an established framework), on
emerging technology. As Professor Kerr has observed in his influential work,
judges are largely reliant on parties to bring them information about new
technologies, and, due to stare decisis, the rules they announce cannot easily be
changed.257 This, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, makes them
cautious when evaluating the effect of new technology on constitutional law.258
Moreover, though judges’ intimate knowledge of the bail system (with
monitoring as its use becomes increasingly common) may help make them
more comfortable with intervening, that same comfort level, and indeed their
active role in setting bail, may cut against intervention. Adding to the case for
judicial caution are the deep marks left by the history of the judiciary’s
involvement in prison reform259 and the lasting backlash against it: in recent
years, the courts have been extremely reluctant to require costly remedies even
for the most severe constitutional violations.260 In light of that experience,
judges will be extremely hesitant to be seen as requiring taxpayers to foot the
bill for improvements in criminal defendants’ quality of life or as
micromanaging detention policies.
Due to these factors, courts are likely to require extremely convincing proof
of the effectiveness and efficiency of monitoring technology before mandating
that it be offered as an alternative to detention. Even the relatively modest
performance advantage of money bail over personal recognizance bonds and its
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Kerr, supra note 236, at 871, 875-76.
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see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (concluding that “[t]he medical and mental
health care provided by California’s prisons falls below the standard of decency that inheres
in the Eighth Amendment” and that the remedy required a “reduction in overcrowding”).

1402

pretrial detention and the right to be monitored

arguable cost savings (to the state) over existing pretrial services programs
currently insulate it from judicial attack. Despite some promising results from
pretrial monitoring and growing experience with its use in other contexts,
courts will be hesitant to consistently grant monitoring in lieu of detention to
indigent, non-dangerous defendants until at least a few jurisdictions adopt
monitoring more widely in lieu of detention and have established a welldocumented record of failure-to-appear rates at least equal to those of
traditional money bail systems for similarly situated defendants at equal or
lesser cost.261 A large-scale study, funded by the National Institute of Justice, of
the effectiveness of electronic monitoring at reducing recidivism among
released felons in Florida showed that it reduced failure rates by over thirty
percent compared with other forms of supervision.262 A similar study with
respect to flight risk and money bail would be a critical data point. The four
states that have abolished money bail are perhaps the most likely candidates to
provide the necessary data, and they would be a logical starting place for
reform efforts.
Further, any remedies that are eventually imposed are likely to be imposed
gradually to allow jurisdictions to spread out fixed costs and gain familiarity
with the technology. In the pretrial context, the judiciary will likely not be at
the vanguard of reform. But delayed, gradual reform is better than its probable
alternative, no reform. Even the relatively modest intervention contemplated
here would bring significant benefits. In the absence of judicial action,
thousands of criminal defendants will continue to be detained—and suffer all
of the deleterious effects of detention—long after available technology would
allow the government to achieve its goals at lower financial and human cost.
No matter how sound the policy, of course, judicial intervention requires a
judicial basis for decision, which this Essay has located primarily in the Eighth
Amendment.
conclusion
At any given time, thousands of criminal defendants around the country
are imprisoned to ensure their presence at trial despite being eligible for
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release, simply because they lack the financial resources to make bail.
Monitoring technology, which will only increase in effectiveness and decline in
cost, is already in wide use, including as a condition of bail,263 and represents a
far less burdensome means of achieving the government’s aims. Moreover,
especially as compared to the potential gains from releasing those currently
held for trial, net-widening concerns are fairly minor, as the means of ensuring
trial presence appear to have relatively little effect on the size of the overall
criminal defendant population, and within that population there are relatively
few currently released without various types of conditions.264
In many cases governments will adopt less-intrusive, cost-effective
technologies voluntarily, without judicial prompting. This has been the case
with police use of advancing investigative techniques generally. But wellestablished theory and long and bitter experience strongly suggest that when
adopting these technologies would aid the poor and unpopular at the expense
of established lobbies, they will not be adopted through the political process. If
they are not, courts must intervene. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of excessive bail, and if it is to fulfill its core purpose of preventing
needless or discriminatory pretrial detention, it must require the use of
technologies that prevent flight as efficiently and effectively as the bail system
without its concomitant detention. Building the necessary evidentiary record
will be a significant hurdle for advocates, and courts will have to overcome
their reluctance to involve themselves in the mechanics of both pretrial justice
and detention, but these challenges must be met. If they are not, the iniquitous
result will be a twenty-first-century system of detection coupled with a
nineteenth-century system of detention.
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